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The rise of political Islam in the Muslim Middle East is a critical development certain to 
shape political and social change in the region for decades to come. Political Islam is 
bound to exert a particularly strong influence on civil-military relations due to the legacy 
of military dominance of state institutions. Drawing on the reform experiences in Iran, 
Turkey, and Egypt, this thesis argues that a distinct pattern of civil-military relations is 
beginning to emerge in which Islamist governments rely on ideology to mobilize and 
ensure the loyalty of supporters to a degree that clearly distinguishes them from their 
authoritarian and democratic predecessors. While these Islamist-dominated governments 
have utilized some democratic control mechanisms in their efforts to expand their control 
of the government and bring the military under civilian control, this owes more to 
expediency than to a genuine commitment to democratic reform. Although each Islamist 
political organization interprets the Islamization of the state differently and some could 
be considered politically or socially liberal, the primary characteristic of any Islamist 
political organization is to Islamize the state rather than to democratize it—a 
characteristic that has important implications for how Islamist governments assert their 
authority over the military.   
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A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
For much of the twentieth century, it was common for observers of the Muslim 
Middle East inside and outside the region to accept military dominance of the state as a 
natural if not an ideal approach to modernization. Reza Khan’s overthrow of the Qajar 
Dynasty in Iran in 1921, the founding of the Turkish Republic in 1923, Iraq’s Bakr Sidqi 
coup in 1936, Gamal Abdel Nasser’s Revolution in 1952, Algeria’s 1954–1962 War of 
Independence, and Muammar Qaddafi’s “One September Revolution” in 1969 all 
brought the military or civilianized military officers to power with the promise of 
delivering radical change that would accelerate development and bring the state closer to 
modernity. In the decades that followed, these military-dominated regimes proved mostly 
unable to deliver on their promises of reform. Their governments became characterized 
less by political development and economic growth than by corruption, ineptitude, and 
indifference to the needs and concerns of the masses. One by one these military-
dominated regimes witnessed their legitimacy erode until the pressure to reform became 
so overwhelming that the ruling regime either collapsed (such as the downfall of the Shah 
in Iran and Colonel Qadhaffi in Libya) or was forced to relinquish control as part of a 
broader reorganization of political power (the decline of the military in Turkey or the 
resignation of General Tantawi in Egypt). Amidst this shift political Islam has arrived at 
center stage, billing itself as a new, alternative path to modernization. Nearly every 
country in the Muslim Middle East now has at least one organization that seeks to acquire 
political power and establish an Islamist state in which laws and institutions are 
developed in accordance with its own interpretation of religious principles. In countries 
where Islamists organizations have become the preeminent political authority, the most 
pressing issue they have to confront is the legacy of the military-dominated state. 
This thesis provides an examination of how Islamists have confronted this 
challenge in the three states where the legacy of military dominance has been most 
pronounced: Iran, Turkey, and Egypt. The objective is to determine whether or not a 
distinct Islamist approach to civil-military relations (CMR) can be identified through 
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comparative analysis. The primary focus is on the methods that civilian leaders employ to 
subordinate the coercive arm of the state and the rights and prerogatives that the military 
and security forces enjoy either as individuals or as corporate entities.  
B. IMPORTANCE  
Although militaries have long enjoyed a prominent role in national politics in the 
Muslim Middle East, CMR in the region remains an under-scrutinized field of inquiry. 
Academic analyses of CMR have become increasingly intertwined with the literature on 
democratization whereby effective civilian control of the military is treated simply a step 
along the path toward democratic consolidation. Most theoretical approaches to CMR 
tend to depict a continuum stretching across a singular axis, with overt military 
dictatorship at one extreme to democratic civilian control over the military at the other. 
This conceptualization is usually accompanied by a prescription calling for physical and 
ideological separation of civilian and military institutions, with the parameters of the 
latter defined by the former.1 Such a model fails to capture the complex nature of CMR 
in the Middle East, where civilian control of the military has often increased while 
democratization has stalled or regressed.  
The need for new research on CMR in the Muslim Middle East is further 
underscored by the speed with which CMR in the region appears to be changing. As 
recently as 2007, one of the foremost scholars of the region’s politics described how the 
militaries of Algeria, Turkey, and Egypt retained de facto control over their respective 
states’ instruments of power (political, economic, bureaucratic, etc.) while avoiding the 
day-to-day business of governance.2 The events of the last five years have raised serious 
questions about the political, social, and economic roles of the Turkish and Egyptian 
militaries; only in Algeria has the military continued to enjoy continued dominance of the 
state. Seismic changes are also occurring in Iran where the IRGC’s growing political 
                                                 
1 Rebecca Schiff, “Civil-Military Relations Reconsidered: A Theory of Concordance,” Armed Forces 
and Society 22, no. 1 (Fall 1995). 
2 Steven A. Cook, Ruling but Not Governing (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 
2007).  
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influence is changing the nature of state power, yet in a way that appears to be 
strengthening rather than undermining the rule of the Supreme Leader. 
C. PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESES 
1. Defining Islamism 
Despite volumes of analytical research dedicated to exploring “Islamism,” 
consensus around the meaning of the term remains elusive. Scholars remain divided over 
whether Islamism is a social movement, political cause, or economic reform program; its 
compatibility with democracy; and its ability to support religious diversity. Some allege 
that Islamism is a negatively-defined ideology that provides a “coherent narrative about 
what ails Muslim societies and where the cure lies.”3 For these observers, Islamism is a 
rejectionist theory borne out of popular frustration with the West and corrupt 
authoritarian governments in the Middle East. Others have sought to frame Islamism as 
something decidedly more progressive; a parallel track to modernity that avoids the moral 
pitfalls of Western modernization. Still others describe Islamism in more conservative 
terms—a return to the Quranic teachings prescriptions as envisioned by the Prophet.4 The 
competing interpretations of Islamism make it difficult to assign the label to any 
particular state or regime let alone multiple states as part of a comparative analysis. 
Such distinctions are often more apparent than real. Each of the Islamist 
movements examined in this thesis is an ideology-based political movement that was 
forced underground by military-dominated regimes suspicious of Islamist organizations. 
Once in power, all three have embraced at least partial democratization as a means to 
expand and legitimize their own authority at the expense of potential political 
adversaries, including the military.  
                                                 
3 John Owen, “Why Islamism is Winning,” New York Times, January 7, 2012. 
4 For example, Ali Bulac describes Islamism as “Islam coming to life, following its authority and 
ideals, with the intention of it to be established in every historical and societal condition in the world.” He 
goes on to claim that all Muslims are by definition also Islamists, and that “Religion, reduced merely to 
faith, morals, and worship, is not ‘the religion that Allah has chosen for us and brought to perfection’ 
(5/Maide, 3).” Ali Bulac, “On Islamism: Its Roots, Development and Future,” Insight Turkey, Vol. 14, No. 
4 (2012). 
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a. Islamism as a Political Movement 
Despite Islamism’s myriad definitions, most observers are quick to 
distinguish Islam from Islamism. As Bassam Tibi notes, “Islam itself is basically a faith, 
a cultural system, and an ethics—and hence not necessarily political by its nature.”5 
Islamism, by contrast, refers to a political movement, or, more accurately, several 
different political movements, all of which maintain that Islam should serve as the 
primary guide for determining how institutions of the state should be designed and 
maintained. 
In this thesis, the term “Islamism” is applied to three particular political 
movements: the mullahs who came to power in Iran under the leadership of Ayatollah 
Ruhollah Khomeini and continue to run the state today, the Justice and Development 
Party in Turkey, and the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt. This is not to suggest that all 
three share the same values or seek to wield power in the same way. Rather, it is merely a 
way of acknowledging that in all three countries, Islamic ideals have been vital in 
propelling a political organization or movement to a position of political dominance. By 
using the term “Islamism” to describe a political phenomenon rather than a specific belief 
system or ideology, this thesis seeks to avoid the thornier debates about theology and 
interpretations of the Quran. While such analysis may help explain certain tendencies 
among Islamist governments, this thesis seeks to examine how political Islamism 
manifests itself in the arena of CMR as opposed to why.  
b. Islamism’s Ideological Component 
Use of the term “Islamist” to describe the dominant political movements 
in Iran, Turkey, and Egypt is a fairly controversial proposition. The term “Islamism” is 
almost universally disavowed in Turkey, where Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan 
has repeatedly insisted that his Justice and Development Party (AKP) is not an Islamist 
organization but instead an “Islamic conservative party,” and Fethullah Gülen, leader of 
the country’s largest Islamic movement, maintains that his followers are informed by an 
                                                 
5 Bassam Tibi. “Islamist Parties: Why They Can’t Be Democratic,” Journal of Democracy 19, no. 
(2008). 
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inclusive “spirit of mobility” that emphasizes tolerance, dialogue, and compassion and 
bears no resemblance to Islamist organizations that have sought to transform Islam into a 
political ideology.6 Likewise, some observers have argued that Iran’s clerical leadership 
is an outlier among Islamist political movements, and that Islamists in other countries are 
generally pragmatic organizations committed to democratic principles and processes.7  
Islamism is not monolithic: it is not a unitary movement with a singular 
objective.8 Islamism is an umbrella term that encompasses several different movements, 
each of which seeks its own objectives that are in turn informed by different principles. 
Yet if we are to endow the term “Islamism” with any meaning at all, it is vital not to 
reject comparative analyses as intrinsically flawed or allow the distinctions among 
Islamist movements to overshadow that which unites Islamist organizations of all stripes. 
What is common to all Islamist political movements is an ideology that 
connects political goals with Islamic ideals. In this sense, all Islamist political movements 
are also ideological movements. In each case, the ultimate goal is to Islamize the state. 
What this means in practice can vary tremendously from one state to another and 
movement to the next. This is why Islamism has taken a more democratic form in places 
like Tunisia and Jordan and a more authoritarian one in Iran and the Gaza Strip. But 
while the differences among Islamist movements may be substantial, the differences 
within any particular movement tend to be fairly narrow as no movement can remain 
unified if its members hold radically divergent visions of the state. While individual 
                                                 
6 The AKP’s political program, available on the party’s website, refers to secularism as “a pre-
requisite of democracy, and an assurance of the freedom of religion and conscience” and “rejects the 
interpretation and distortion of secularism as enmity against religion.” Justice and Development Party, AKP 
Party Program Chapter II, “Fundamental Rights and Political Principles,” 
http://www.akparti.org.tr/english/akparti/parti-programme#bolum_; Enes Ergene, “Political Islam or the 
Concept of Islamism,” Fethullah Gülen Movement Online, August 6, 2008, 
http://www.fethullahgulen.org/gulen-movement/on-the-movement/an-analysis-of-the-gulen-
movement/26375-political-islam-or-the-concept-of-islamism. 
7 Marwan Muasher, “The Overblown Islamist Threat,” New York Times, November 2, 2011 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/03/opinion/the-overblown-islamist-threat.html?_r=0 . 
8 Some Islamist organizations do, however, have linkages that stretch across borders. The Muslim 
Brotherhood, most notably, has sister organizations in nearly every country in the Muslim Middle East. 
However, even the leaders of these sub-groups are guided by different by different principles. For example, 
Hamas, an organization founded by Muslim Brotherhood affiliates in the mid-1980s, still insists on the 
right to employ violence to achieve political goals despite the parent organization’s disavowal of such 
tactics.  
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Islamist organizations may be more or less liberal or supportive of democratic principles, 
all are movements that have demonstrated a capacity to mobilize supporters on the basis 
of a shared vision. 
The dominant Islamist movements in Iran, Turkey, and Egypt have all 
relied on a fusion of political and religious ideals to expand their bases of popular support 
in pursuit of political power. Within each of these movements, members are united by a 
shared vision of the state—a vision that gives members both purpose and direction, and 
serves as a sort of ideological glue to prevent the movement from splitting apart. While 
Iran’s Islamism may be guided a far more conservative ideology than that of Turkey’s 
Gülenist movement, that should not suggest that the Gülenists are non-ideological. 
Indeed, the variations between Islamist movements in Iran, Turkey, and Egypt are what 
make them a worthwhile source for comparison. At the present time, there may be no 
better way to understand what Islamism is and is not than a comparative study of how it 
has managed political power in Iran, Turkey, and Egypt—three states appear to run the 
gamut from the most to least politically free in the Muslim Middle East.9 
c. The Conspiratorial Nature of Islamist Movements 
The isolation and persecution that Islamists faced under pre-Islamist 
governments in Iran, Turkey, and Egypt, continues to play a critical role in how these 
movements approach political leadership. Because Islamists grew accustomed to 
operating underground before taking the reins of power, they have adopted an approach 
to politics that can be generally described as conspiratorial. Islamist movements often 
display an intense distrust of outsiders. Warnings from Islamist leaders about foreign 
infiltration cannot be dismissed as demagoguery or fear-mongering; rather, they often 
reflect genuine anxiety about external forces committed to the destruction of their  
 
 
                                                 
9 According to Freedom House’s 2013 report, “Partly free” Turkey was assigned a “Freedom Rating” 
of 3.0, which made it freer than every state in the region other than Israel. Iran, meanwhile, was assigned a 
6.0 rating and designated “not free”; only Syria and Saudi Arabia scored worse (both with a worst-possible 
7.0). Egypt fell right in the middle with a 5.0 rating and a “partly free” designation. “Freedom in the World 
2013: Democratic Breakthroughs in the Balance,” Freedom House.  
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Islamist vision. One can see this tendency when Turkey’s Islamists suggest that 
secularists might be “hidden Jews” or Iran’s leaders accuse the CIA of creating a militant 
group like Jundallah.  
Consequently, Islamist movements have been built largely on 
interpersonal networks and thrive on trust and personal relationships. In this regard, the 
evolution of Islamist movements bears a strong similarity to that of the Bolsheviks, 
Maoists, or even the Ba’athists. This suggests that the single party totalitarian model of 
governance also bears relevance to this study. These similarities are important and will be 
further explored in Chapter III; however, it is important to note the limitations of any 
such comparison. Chief among them is the vital role that democratic processes play in 
Islamist states. 
d. Islamism’s “Instrumental” View of Democracy 
Intimately connected to the discussion of Islamism and ideology is the 
debate about the compatibility of Islamism and democracy. At one extreme are those who 
maintain that the “principles of Islam are in contradiction to the values of civilian society 
and democracy.”10 At the other are those who have defined the relationship between 
Islam and democracy “in a positive context,” rejecting the possibility of non-democratic 
interpretations of Islam.11 This is not merely an academic argument as there is 
tremendous variation in how each movement has translated its principles into practice. If 
we evaluate Islamists solely by their rhetoric, it is clear that they are not intrinsically 
hostile to democratic ideas on processes. Some Islamist leaders, including Ayatollah 
Khomeini, deny the possibility of any conflict between democratic and Islamist values: 
[T]to juxtapose “democratic” and “Islamic” is an insult to Islam. Because 
when you place the word “democratic” in front of “Islamic,” it means that 
Islam is lacking in the alleged virtues of democracy, although Islam is, in 
fact, superior to all forms of democracy. To speak of a “democratic 
Islamic republic” is like speaking of a “justice- oriented Islamic republic.” 
                                                 
10 David Bukay, “The Military in Politics: Is the Military Bulwark against Islamism Collapsing?” 
Middle East Quarterly (2009). 
11 Ergun Yildirim, “Plural Islamism in Plural Modernities,” Insight Turkey 14, No. 4 (2012). 
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That is an insult to Islam because it suggests that justice is something 
extrinsic to Islam, whereas it is the very substance of Islam.12 
The Muslim Brotherhood has adopted a less defensive position than Khomeini’s, but the 
emphasis on an intimate connection between Islam and democracy remains. The Brothers 
argue that the Egyptian state should be built on a foundation of “Islamic-oriented 
democracy,” suggesting democracy must in essence be purified by passing through the 
prism of Islamic values.13 This hybridization of Islam and democracy is least apparent in 
Turkey, where the AKP and the Gülen movement continue to insist that political 
institutions are and should remain secular; however, the Gülenists are sure to justify their 
support for democracy on Islamic grounds, arguing that: 
Islam holds individuals and societies responsible for their own fate, people 
must be responsible for governing themselves. The Quran addresses 
society with such phrases as: “O people!” and “O believers!” The duties 
entrusted to modern democratic systems are those that Islam refers to 
society and classifies, in order of importance, as “absolutely necessary, 
relatively necessary, and commendable to carry out.”14  
Such statements are not merely empty rhetoric. Because Islamist movements tend to 
spring from grassroots organizations, their leaders may find democracy to be the quickest 
and surest route to political power. Islamists have proven adept at capitalizing on their 
organizational strength to effect desired changes through competitive elections. 
Democratic processes also serve a vital legitimizing function as they allow Islamist 
organizations to point to success at the ballot box in order to silence critics at home and 
abroad. 
Yet even the most liberal of Islamist movements maintains what Tibi 
describes as an “instrumental” view of democracy.15 That is, Islamist movements rely on 
democratic procedures only insofar as they help the movement promote and realize 
                                                 
12 Ruhollah Khomeini and Hamid Algar. Islam and Revolution: Writings and Declarations of Imam 
Khomeini (Berkeley: Mizan Press, 1980), 339. 
13 IkwhanWeb, “Muslim Brotherhood and Democracy in Egypt,” June 13, 2007, 
http://www.ikhwanweb.com/article.php?id=808.  
14 Fethullah Gülen Movement Online, “A Comparative Approach to Islam and Democracy,” January 
7, 2013, http://www.gulenmovement.us/a-comparative-approach-to-islam-and-democracy.html. 
15 Tibi, “Islamist Parties,” 44.  
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Islamist objectives. Democratic principles such as judicial independence, press freedom, 
and the right to peaceful assembly have been systematically undermined as part of an 
effort to suppress dissent from non-Islamists. In Iran, non-Islamists have been barred 
from competing in elections. In Turkey, prosecutions and imprisonment have become 
common for journalists who have raised questions about Islamist beliefs and practices. 
And in Egypt, the Muslim Brotherhood has continued to rely on harsh tactics to subdue 
mass protests. In effect, Islamist movements have employed tactics characteristic of 
“competitive authoritarianism.” According to Levitsky and Way: 
Competitive authoritarian regimes are civilian regimes in which formal 
democratic institutions exist and are widely viewed as the primary means 
of gaining power, but in which incumbents’ abuse of the state places them 
at a significant advantage vis-à-vis their opponents. Such regimes are 
competitive in that opposition parties use democratic institutions to contest 
seriously for power, but they are not democratic because the playing field 
is heavily skewed in favor of incumbents.16  
Although Levitsky and Way do not include Islamist states in their analysis, there are 
significant similarities, Islamists in pre–2009 Iran, AKP-led Turkey, and post-Mubarak 
Egypt have all relied on democratic procedures to secure political power but have 
severely undermined democratic institutions once in office, To put it another way 
Islamist organizations tend to embrace “the methods and lineaments of democracy” 
without accepting its “cultural and political values” once in power.17 Islamists have 
shown little interest in inclusionary politics or compromise. They may engage in tactical 
alliances with potential adversaries, particularly secular political groups and the military, 
but these have invariably been temporary arrangements. In all three countries Islamists 
have alienated allies en route to consolidating their authority.  
For all the pro-democracy rhetoric that Islamists employ, Islamist 
movements do not owe their fidelity to democratic ideals. Consequently, democratic 
principles will be sacrificed or subverted whenever they come into conflict with the 
                                                 
16 Steven Levitsky and Lucan Way, Competitive Authoritarianism: Hybrid Regimes after the Cold 
War (New York: Cambridge, 2010), 5. 
17 Amr Elshobaki, “Building Democracy or Confronting the Islamists?” European Union Institute for 
Security Studies, no. 10 (November 2011), 10.2815/22223, 
http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/Egyptian_democracy_and_the_Muslim_Brotherhood.pdf.  
 10 
Islamists’ pursuit of maximizing temporal power. Such subversions run little risk of 
alienating core supporters as long as they are perceived as conducive to the Islamists’ 
ultimate objective of establishing an Islamist state. Although Islamists may be patient and 
pragmatic, this is because they recognize the potential of political overreach to provoke a 
backlash that would hinder their ultimate objective of Islamizing the state. Patience and 
pragmatism should not be confused with democratic virtues like inclusiveness and 
compromise.   
2. An Islamist Approach to CMR 
The short history and limited sample size of Islamist-dominated states make it 
difficult to speak of a distinctly Islamist model of CMR; however, certain patterns of 
interaction have emerged that make it possible to discuss Islamist approaches to CMR in 
terms of trends or parameters. These trends are derivative of the chief characteristics of 
Islamist movements previously discussed. In other words, Islamist governments tend to 
view the military primarily in political terms, they may seek to impose their ideology on 
the force, rely on interpersonal connections and networks to establish control and 
determine leadership roles within the armed forces, and utilize democratic oversight 
mechanisms for the purpose of maximizing control rather than out of a commitment to 
genuine democratic reform.  
The most immediate goal for any Islamist organization is to reduce the military’s 
political influence and capacity for intervention. While this process may be partially or 
even wholly consistent with democratic approaches to civilian oversight of the military, 
this is not because Islamist organizations particularly value democratic control 
mechanisms. Rather it is because democratic approaches to asserting authority over the 
military are the least likely to provoke opposition from non-Islamists or foreign observers 
which may make them the easiest to implement. The clearest example of this is Turkey 
where the AKP relied on European Union (EU) accession process to implement dramatic 
changes that minimized the military’s influence over politics. While these reforms were 
initially hailed by the international community as evidence of the AKP’s commitment to 
democratic reform, subsequent events, including a series of investigations that have 
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placed many of the military’s senior leaders in jail, strongly suggest that the AKP was 
never as interested in democratic reform as it was in weakening the country’s historically 
powerful military. 
Islamist governments may also seek to use the military as a vehicle for expanding 
an Islamist ideology after it has been effectively neutralized. At the very least this entails 
the promotion of religious officers sympathetic to Islamist objectives. An example of this 
is the promotion of General Abdul Fattah al-Sisi, widely regarded as a deeply religious 
man, to Defense Minister in Egypt.18 In Iran, use of the military to advance an Islamist 
ideology is far more advanced as volunteers and conscripts alike are subjected to an 
intense indoctrination program. That similar programs have not been put into effect in 
Turkey and Egypt may be more a matter of time and political constraints (the Turkish  
and Egyptian militaries remain far more popular and influential than the Shah’s military 
was at the time of the Islamic Revolution) more than genuine respect for military 
professionalism and autonomy.  
3. Identifying a Framework for Evaluating CMR  
Traditional civil-military scholarship tends to focus on the balance of power 
between the armed forces and civilian leadership: too much military control leaves the 
civilian component weak, impotent, and unstable, whereas too much civilian control can 
leave the country unprepared for national security challenges. However, this formulation 
is generally insufficient for assessing CMR in the Middle East, where it is not uncommon 
for the military to enjoy tremendous privileges while posing virtually no threat to the 
civilian leadership’s control of the government. The civil-military relationship is 
characterized by co-dependence rather than contestation. While rivalry and distrust 
between the country’s civilian and military leaders might still play a critical role in 
determining CMR outcomes, this antagonism rarely if ever threatens the civil leaders’  
 
 
                                                 
18 “Profile: Egypt Armed Forces Chief Abdul Fattah al-Sisi,” BBC News, August 21, 2012, 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-19256730.  
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control of the state. This dynamic has important implications for both pre- and post-
Islamist governments in the region, as it captures the essence of CMR in both Mubarak’s 
Egypt and the Islamic Republic of Iran. 
One of the key challenges of this thesis will be to analyze CMR in a way that is 
cognizant of such complexity. This requires a broad interpretation of the factors relevant 
to CMR. While some studies on CMR focus exclusively on constitutional prerogatives, 
budgets, mission analysis, and force structures, such an approach is far too narrow for the 
militaries of the Middle East, where the military often penetrates all aspects of political 
and social life. Economic development, the law, education, civil liberties, and even 
national identity itself are all intimately connected to the military in both real and 
symbolic ways. CMR studies of the Middle East are complicated further by the role of 
the security sector, as police and intelligence agencies are frequently as large as the 
military itself and are responsible for providing services that may overlap with military 
functions and areas of responsibility. 
D. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The scholarship relevant to this thesis can be roughly divided into four fields: 
CMR theory, analyses of political Islam, comparative studies of the Middle East, and 
studies of particular countries examined in this thesis. 
Chapter II is dedicated to a thorough review of the CMR literature as it pertains to 
political Islam; however, it should be noted here that Huntington’s The Soldier and the 
State, published more than fifty years ago, remains the most influential work in the 
field.19 Despite the book’s emphasis on CMR on U.S. military history, it outlines a broad 
theoretical framework intended to be universally applicable. Huntington’s emphasis is on 
defining “objective control,” or the process by which the military internalizes its 
apolitical role and renders itself “politically sterile and neutral.”20 Objective civilian 
control remains the most influential concept in the field of CMR; most scholars in the 
field focus on developing tools to effectively assess objective civilian control. One 
                                                 
19 Samuel Huntington, Soldier and the State (Cambridge: Harvard, 1957). 
20 Ibid., 83–4. 
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prominent example is Alfred Stepan’s Rethinking Military Politics, in which Stepan 
outlines eleven “military prerogatives” in which the military “assumes they have acquired 
the right or privilege, formal or informal, to exercise effective control over its internal 
governance, to play a role within extramilitary areas within the state apparatus, or even to 
structure relationships between state and political or civil society.”21  
While Stepan’s approach may be useful for evaluating CMR as part of democratic 
consolidation and for explaining how and why objective civilian control of the military 
has not yet matured in an ostensibly democratic state, studies like his do not attempt to 
examine how or why undemocratic patterns of CMR have proven so durable in certain 
contexts. Indeed, this limitation is characteristic of much CMR scholarship, which has 
become increasingly intertwined with the literature of democratization. In The Third 
Wave, Huntington dismisses the value of evaluating such arrangements, arguing that “the 
experience of the Third Wave strongly suggests that liberalized authoritarianism is not a 
stable equilibrium; the halfway house does not stand.”22 This kind of thinking, common 
in the immediate aftermath of the collapse of the Soviet Union, has proven fallacious 
over the last two decades, as evidenced by the experiences of Russia, China, former 
Soviet Republics, and, of course, the Middle East. In all of these cases, authoritarian 
regimes have introduced token democratic reforms to maintain a veneer of political 
liberalism. Jason Brownlee has confronted Huntington’s argument about the vulnerability 
of “halfway houses” even more directly with an empirical study demonstrating that 
authoritarian regimes with elements of pluralism have become “twice as common as fully 
closed exclusionary authoritarianism.”23  
Brownlee and others have attempted to address this contradiction by examining 
the nature of power and political stability in the region’s “halfway houses.” Cook, 
Brooks, and Kamrava—whose conclusions will be reviewed in Chapter III—have all 
recognized the primacy of militaries in these regimes and offer complementary 
                                                 
21 Alfred C. Stepan, Rethinking Military Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988), 93. 
22 Samuel Huntington, The Third Wave (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991), 137. 
23 Jason Brownlee, “Ruling Parties and Durable Authoritarianism,” Stanford Center on Democracy, 
Development, and the Rule of Law, Working Paper 23, October 28, 2004.  
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explanations for how civilian governments managed to prevent the threat of military 
coups without actually subordinating the military in ways characteristic of consolidated 
democracies.24 However, most of this work predates the rise of the AKP in Turkey and 
the Arab Spring, which are almost certainly the two most significant developments for 
political Islam since 1979.  
Although comparative studies of CMR may be lagging behind current political 
developments, the same cannot be said for country-specific analyses. Academic and 
research institutions have produced a wealth of analysis on CMR developments in Iran 
and Turkey (and to a lesser extent in Egypt). This trend is most pronounced in studies on 
CMR reform in Turkey under the AKP. However, many of these authors have taken the 
party’s commitment to democratization for granted. Mario Zucconi, Ersel Aydnl, Müge 
Aknur, Sevgi Akarcesme, and Pavel Danek, among many others, all treat the decline of 
military tutelage in Turkey as either a consequence of democratic currents in Turkish 
society or a result of a deliberate democratic reform campaign crafted by the AKP for the 
primary purpose of accelerating the EU accession process.25 While such descriptions 
bear more than a grain of truth, they tend to obscure the profoundly un-democratic trends 
in AKP-run Turkey, including the imprisonment and intimidation of journalists and other 
regime critics and the rapidly growing power of the Fethullah Gülen movement—an 
ostensibly secular Islamist organization whose followers own and operate dozens of 
schools and universities, major business conglomerates, several major media outlets, and 
are reportedly in control of several government agencies and departments, including the 
Turkish National Police (TNP) and the judiciary.  
                                                 
24 Risa Brooks, Political-Military Relations and the Stability of Arab Regimes (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1998); Cook, Ruling but Not Governing. 
25 See Mario Zucconi, “The Impact of the EU Connection on Turkey’s Domestic and Foreign Policy,” 
Turkish Studies 10, no. 1., March 2009; Müge Aknur, “The Impact of Civil-Military Relations on 
Democratic Consolidation in Turkey,” in Democratic Consolidation in Turkey ed. by Müge Aknur (Boca 
Raton, FL: Universal-Publishers: 2012), 203–248; Ersel Aydnl, “Civil-Military Relations Transformed,” 
Journal of Democracy 23, no. 1 (January 2012): 100–108; Pavel Danek, Changes in Civil-Military 
Relations in Turkey since the Late 90s (Berlin: Lambert, 2011); Sevgi Akarcesme, Military of Civilian 
Supremacy in Turkey? The New Framework of Civil-Military Relations in the Post-Feb 28 Era, Berlin: 
Lambert Academic Publishing, 2010. 
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Analyses of CMR in Iran, on the other hand, make little mention of progress 
toward democracy. Most studies focus on making sense of the country’s complex 
security decision-making structure and the respective roles of—and rivalries between—
the regular military and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). Cann and 
Danopoulos review several competing explanations for the quiescence of the military to 
the regime, including the officer purges of the early 1980s, the regime’s capacity to 
repress dissent, and cultural indoctrination.26 Their conclusion, which echoes Huntington 
and Kamrava, is that the regular military’s internal divisions and competition with the 
IRGC prevented the armed forces from becoming involved in domestic politics. In other 
words, Iranian CMR is discussed in a manner that suggests it is no different than in other 
autocratic regimes, such as Mubarak-era Egypt or Qadhaffi-era Libya.  
One weakness with many of these studies is that they have not attempted to 
isolate Islamism as an independent variable to understand its impact on the forms and 
functions of political power. Likewise, the ever-growing body of scholarship on political 
Islam remains dominated by abstract and normative questions. Analysis of Islamism’s 
ground truths—how its concepts become manifest in issues of real world governance—is 
yet to be undertaken in a serious and comprehensive way. Wright’s The Islamists are 
Coming; Brown, Ülgen, Ottaway, and Salem’s “The Emerging Order in the Middle 
East”; Dessouki’s “Official Islam and Political Legitimation in the Arab Countries”; and 
Kurzman and Naqvi’s “Do Muslims Vote Islamic?” have all emphasized the flexibility of 
Islamism in addressing modern political problems.27 Each of these works identifies what 
Brown describes as the “diversity of the Islamist part of the political spectrum” to argue 
that differing interpretations of Islam, cultural variations, and political constraints will 
continue to produce vastly different results in states where Islamists have assumed 
                                                 
26 Rebecca Cann and Constantine Danopoulos, “The Military and Politic in a Theocratic State: Iran as 
a Case Study,” Armed Forces and Society (Winter 2007): 269–88. 
27 Robin Wright, The Islamists are Coming (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2005); 
Sinan Ülgen, Nathan Brown, Marina Ottaway, and Paul Salem, “The Emerging Order in the Middle East,” 
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace Policy Outlook (May 2012), 
http://carnegieendowment.org/files/middle_east_order1.pdf; Ali E. Hillal Dessouki, “Official Islam and 
Political Legitimation in the Arab Countries,” in The Islamic Impulse, ed. Barbara Freyer Stowasser 
(Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press: 1987); Charles Kurzman and Ijlal Naqvi, “Do Muslims 
Vote Islamic?” Journal of Democracy 21, no. 2 (April 2010): 50. 
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power.28 These studies generally offer little with respect to how Islamist political 
organizations consolidate power and have taken at least partial democratization for 
granted.  
This stove-piped approach to analysis is problematic for both fields of inquiry. 
CMR studies that fail to examine the nature and meaning of Islamism are forced to 
interpret the relationship between civilian and military leaders in Islamist states through 
either a democratic or an authoritarian lens. This carries a high risk for misinterpretation. 
Because most scholars described the AKP’s CMR reforms prior to 2007 in terms of 
democratic consolidation, few anticipated the more authoritarian tendencies the party has 
demonstrated over the last six years. Likewise, academic debates about the meaning of 
Islamism are generally plagued by the selective use of data and self-serving theological 
interpretations. Yet the proliferation of Islamist governments has begun to provide 
enough empirical data to challenge these normative arguments. Because CMR reform has 
been the top priority in states where Islamist organizations have achieved their greatest 
successes, the field provides the richest source of data for making sense of what Islamism 
is and is not.  
E. THESIS OVERVIEW 
Chapter II will provide an overview of theoretical and empirical approaches to 
CMR and offer some general observations of research trends. The intent of this chapter is 
to outline the scope of CMR in order to frame the analysis of particular countries that 
follows in subsequent chapters. 
Chapter III provides an overview of CMR trends in the Middle East prior to and 
concurrent with the rise of Islamist regimes. This chapter seeks to place the emergence of 
Islamism within the broader context of regional political development in order to 
demonstrate how Islamist regimes represent both a break with and continuation of 
longstanding trends in regional CMR.  
                                                 
28 Ülgen et al., “Emerging Order in the Middle East.” 
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Chapters IV, V, and VI will investigate CMR in Iran, Turkey, and Egypt, 
respectively. These chapters will attempt to provide a brief history pre-Islamist CMR 
trends in order to provide context for Islamist CMR development. Key areas of focus will 
include a discussion of the roles and missions of the military and security services, the 
military’s role in domestic and foreign policy decision-making, access to resources, and 
the institutional factors that enable or inhibit military influence. 
Chapter VII will be the conclusion, in which I summarize the key findings of this 













II. IDENTIFYING A FRAMEWORK FOR EVALUATING CMR 
IN ISLAMIST STATES 
A. THEORETICAL APPROACHES 
At a minimum, all examinations of CMR seek to answer one fundamental 
question: How do militaries and civilian leaders coexist within a state? Most CMR 
scholars describe military subordination to democratically-elected civilian leaders as  
the ideal condition, but there is nothing inevitable or organic about such an arrangement. 
In most states, the armed forces maintain sufficient resources—equipment, training,  
and manpower—to pose a credible threat to the civilian leaders’ control of the  
government. This threat can assume a variety of forms. Soldiers can turn their guns on 
the government and assume power for themselves, exploit their government’s 
dependence on coercive power in order to secure privileges for themselves, or put down 
their weapons to allow a restive population or rival political faction to seize power and 
depose the incumbent leadership.29  
While civilian control of the armed forces may be the most fundamental question 
of CMR scholarship, it is not the only one. As Peter Feaver notes, CMR “is a very broad 
subject, encompassing the entire range of relationships between the military and civilian 
society at every level.”30 Historians, sociologists, and philosophers have all made 
important contributions to the field. Their work generally falls into two categories: 
theoretical analyses that attempt to explain how and why relations between the military 
and the state evolve as they do, and empirical or descriptive studies that analyze CMR 
                                                 
29As Samuel Finer notes, CMR scholars should ask not “why the military engage in politics,” but 
instead “why they ever do otherwise.” Samuel Finer, The Man on Horseback (Boulder: Westview, 1988), 
5. 
30 Peter Feaver, “Civil-Military Relations,” Annual Review of Political Science 2 (1999): 211. See also 
Thomas Bruneau and Cris Matei, Routledge Handbook of Civil-Military Relations (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 2003), 17. 
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within particular states, regions, or regime types.31 This paper seeks to contribute to the 
latter body of research; however, it is first necessary to review the theoretical work in 
order to outline the parameters for analysis. 
1. Huntington and the Subjective-Objective Control Dichotomy 
The most prominent CMR theorist is Samuel Huntington, whose Soldier and the 
State remains the most cited and controversial work on the subject. Huntington’s primary 
focus is on civilian control of the military, which he defines in two ways. The first, 
“subjective control,” refers to the “maximizing of the power of civilian groups in relation 
to the military” and according to Huntington can be achieved through institutional 
arrangements, constitutional decree, or as a function of conflict between social classes.32 
Though Huntington argues that subjective control of the armed forces has been the 
historical norm, he is dismissive of its strength and viability. He describes subjective 
control over the military as a “slogan” usually employed by one civilian group or 
institution against another for the purpose of advancing its own interests.33 By contrast, 
“objective control” of the armed forces refers to “the maximizing of military 
professionalism,” or the process by which the coercive arm of the state internalizes the 
concept of civilian control and voluntarily removes itself from domestic politics. A 
military that is objectively controlled by civilian leaders “stands ready to carry out the 
wishes of any civilian group which secures legitimate authority within the state,” but 
remains at all times “politically sterile and neutral.”34 Huntington builds on the 
subjective-objective control dichotomy with two additional factors. The first, the 
military’s “political power,” refers to the legal authority and influence a military enjoys 
within the state. According to Huntington, the military’s political power does not 
                                                 
31 Feaver identifies three trends in the political science research on CMR—normative studies that 
attempt to explain how civilian leaders and militaries should interact, empirical/descriptive studies that 
analyze CMR in particular states or regions, and theoretical works which seek to identify the factors are 
likeliest to produce critical outcomes such as coups or effective civilian control of the military—the overlap 
between the normative and theoretical approaches is so great that the two have become virtually 
indistinguishable. Feaver, “Civil Military Relations,” 214. 
32 Huntington, Soldier and the State, 80–82. 
33 Ibid., 81. 
34 Ibid., 84. 
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necessarily suggest anything about its professionalism: a military can enjoy tremendous 
influence and autonomy within a state without interfering in politics. The second, 
ideology, refers to the values held by the dominant civilian group. By Huntington’s 
definition, ideology can be either pro-military (value the military’s role in society), or 
anti-military (regard the military with skepticism).  
Huntington’s paradigm transcends academic studies of CMR. His terminology is 
still employed by an array of individuals ranging from critics who decry the presence of 
retired American flag officers on cable news programs35 to scholars evaluating the 
prospects for democratization in the developing world.36  Huntington’s influence also 
continues to reverberate within the field of CMR. Leading CMR scholars like Morris 
Janowitz and Bengt Abrahammson build on Huntington’s foundational work rather than 
developing wholly new, alternative models. While both make note of certain weaknesses 
and limitations in Huntington’s approach, their continued reliance on concepts like the 
objective-subjective dichotomy and “military professionalization” reveal durability in 
Huntington’s model. This does not suggest that Huntington’s model is without major, 
fundamental weaknesses. Indeed, such notoriety has in part made Huntington’s 
framework a lightning rod for criticism. Abrahamsson notes that Huntington has 
considerable difficulty “reconcil[ing] his historical accounts of civil-military relations 
with his conceptual scheme.”37 Thomas Bruneau goes further, arguing that Huntington 
had developed a theory that is fatally flawed and a poor basis for empirical analysis. 
According to Bruneau, Huntington’s model is tautological because it fails to distinguish 
between professionalism and objective civilian control; relies too heavily on selective 
data; and is too focused on a narrow conceptualization of civilian control.38 Bruneau’s  
 
 
                                                 
35 Richard H. Kohn, “Tarnished Brass: Is the U.S. Military Profession in Decline?” World Affairs, 
Spring 2009.  
36 Larry Diamond, Civil-Military Relations and Democracy (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1996). 
37 Bengt Abrahamsson, Military Professionalization and Political Power (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage 
Publications, 1972), 149. 
38 Bruneau and Matei, Handbook of Civil-Military Relations, 16. 
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criticism appears to be borne out by the experience of empirical researchers, as even 
those who rely on Huntington’s framework are forced to re-define his terms in order to 
present coherent analysis.39  
2. Principal-Agent Model 
Huntington’s thesis was not designed as a comprehensive or universal analysis of 
CMR but as a predictive analysis of American power and CMR during the Cold War. 
Peter Feaver argues that Huntington’s failure to anticipate actual Cold War outcomes 
raises serious questions about his model and demands an alternative approach to 
evaluating CMR.40 Feaver’s model, which is based on microeconomic theory about 
“principals” and “agents,” holds that: 
The civilian principal establishes a military agent to provide the security 
function for the state, but then must take pains to ensure that the military 
agent continues to do the civilian’s bidding. Given the adverse selection 
and moral hazard problems endemic in any agency relationship, but 
particularly acute in the civil-military context, civilian oversight of the 
military is crucial. Fortunately, civilians have available a wide variety of 
oversight mechanisms, each involving a different degree of intrusiveness 
and therefore each posing a different set of costs on the actors.41  
Feaver’s principal-agent model has several advantages over Huntington’s objective-
subjective dichotomy. For one, it recognizes the power of formal and informal civilian 
control mechanisms over the military. Whereas Huntington dismissed “subjective 
control” mechanisms as a more primitive form of control effective only with respect to an 
“unprofessional” military, Feaver recognizes that they remain potent and relevant even in 
modern states with advanced, professional militaries firmly committed to democratic 
civilian oversight.  
                                                 
39 For example, Mehran Kamrava rejects Huntington’s definition of “professionalization” as 
“complete subordination of the military command to civilian officials” in favor of “the introduction of 
modern military equipment, established procedures for recruitment and promotions, and advanced 
training.” Mehran Kamrava, “Military Professionalization and Civil-Military Relations in the Middle East,” 
Political Science Quarterly 115, no. 1 (Spring 2000). 
40 Peter D. Feaver, Armed Servants: Agency, Oversight, and Civil-Military Relations (Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Press, 2003).  
41 Ibid., 95. 
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Feaver’s model places Huntington’s notion of “professionalism” within the 
context of the interplay between civilian and military leaders. Huntington treated the 
military disengagement from politics as something easily identifiable and as a purely 
endogenous phenomenon. Feaver’s principal-agent model, by contrast, is far more 
inclusive of the subtle forms of political interaction, and is mindful of the costs and 
benefits such interactions can have on either party.  
B. DEMOCRATIC MODELS OF CMR 
The primary weakness of Feaver’s model (and with CMR theories in general) is 
that it does not lend itself to empirical analysis. It is extremely difficult to detect, 
characterize, and quantify the types of CMR interactions described by the principal-agent 
model. Other CMR theorists, however, have developed models with metrics that make 
such analysis much easier. While most CMR theories attempt to explain how and why 
civilian political leaders and militaries interact as they do, empirical studies generally 
eschew such causal analysis, favoring instead an approach to analysis based principally 
on observation. In essence, the empirical work is the “what” to the theoretical work’s 
“why.”  
1. Stepan’s Military Prerogatives 
Alfred Stepan outlines two dimensions for assessing CMR: military 
“contestation,” or the degree to which the military opposes the constraints on its power 
and influence imposed by civilian leaders; and military “prerogatives,” which he defines 
as the “privilege, formal or informal, to exercise effective control over its internal 
governance, to play a role within extra military areas within the state apparatus, or even 
to structure relationships between the state and political or civil society.”42 Stepan 
articulates his prerogatives in a clear, straight-forward manner, which makes them an 
ideal basis for empirical analysis. Whether or not the military enjoys a constitutionally- 
 
 
                                                 
42 Stepan, Rethinking Military Politics, 93. 
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protected role in the politics of the state or the degree to which the military controls its 
own budget, to name just two, can reveal much about the size and scope of the military’s 
role in a given state.  
Stepan’s work represents an improvement over both the Huntington and Feaver 
frameworks in terms of clarity and specificity. However, it remains premised on two 
normative assumptions: civilian control of the military is preferable to military 
dominance of the government and democratic civilian control is preferable to non-
democratic control mechanisms. The question at the center of his model is not, “how do 
civilian leaders and militaries interact within a state?” but instead, “how should they 
interact within a democracy?”  
2. Bruneau and Matei’s Democratic Framework 
Bruneau and Matei largely build on Stepan’s institutional approach, but broaden 
the discussion to include the concepts of military “effectiveness,” or the ability of the 
security services to carry out their assigned missions and tasks, and “efficiency,” which 
refers to their ability to perform these duties at an “optimum cost.”43 Their work differs 
from the others described here in that it does not offer an explanatory theory of CMR, but 
instead attempts to lay out a framework to help guide discussion on the subject. However, 
the framework presumes a certain threshold for democratic maturation that makes it 
difficult for analyzing non-democratic regimes.44 For example, what Bruneau and Matei 
call “democratic civilian control” does not account for non-democratic control 
mechanisms, which include (but are not limited to): judicial and extra-judicial 
punishment for potentially disloyal officers; exploitation of inter-service rivalries to 
reward or punish particular individuals and organizations; and patronage networks 
designed to reward active and retired military personnel with lucrative private and public 
sector employment opportunities. Additionally, the “effectiveness” element presumes a 
mission set consistent with democratic principles. The intelligence agencies, secret 
                                                 
43 Bruneau, Handbook of Civil-Military Relations, 26. 
44 Bruneau and Matei state that their framework is designed to improve analysis of “developing and 
consolidated democracies,” as opposed to totalitarian or authoritarian ones. Ibid., 26. 
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police, and militias charged with spying on citizens and disrupting or intimidating 
dissident groups may be extremely effective in carrying out their assigned missions, but 
the un-democratic nature of their work makes it difficult to apply the term “effectiveness” 
in the way that Bruneau and Matei intended.45  
3. Problematic CMR-Democratization Convergence 
Applying a CMR framework premised on democratic control of the armed forces 
to non-democratic regimes will invariably result in an incomplete and inaccurate 
understanding of the role of the armed forces within the state. This is especially true of 
so-called “hybrid regimes” that attempt to mimic democratic institutions and processes. 
These regimes may appear to employ democratic civilian control when in reality their 
authority derives principally from non-democratic sources.46 The proliferation of such 
regimes in recent decades has yielded a vast sub-literature on regime typologies. Within 
the broad categories of totalitarian, authoritarian, and democratic states, scholars have 
identified countless sub-categories like “hybrid,” “partly free,” “competitive 
authoritarian,” and “illiberal democracies,” all of which attempt to describe not just who 
rules but how legitimacy is derived, how transitions are governed, whether and how 
political opposition elements can challenge for power, and a variety of additional 
characteristics.47  
The mechanisms that help ensure civilian control of the military in these so-called 
hybrid regimes are not necessarily the same as those in democratic states even though 
they may share many of the same features such as elections, courts, and a civilian 
bureaucracy. In these states, democratic practices are often a veneer designed to slow 
rather than accelerate democratic reform. However, there is a temptation to assume that 
these states are transitioning democracies rather than entrenched autocracies hiding 
                                                 
45 Bruneau and Matei maintain that the three pillars of their framework—control, effectiveness, and 
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added). Ibid., 33. 
46 As will be discussed in the next chapter, this is essentially what happened in Iran during the 1990s. 
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behind a democratic façade. When these states fail to develop into mature, functioning 
democracies it is not because their reform efforts failed; rather, it is because they were 
never intended to promote democratic change in the first place. The criteria used to 
determine whether or not such reforms were successful should not derive from abstract or 
idealized notions of democracy, but should instead be based on what such policies were 
actually designed to achieve. For example, a state that holds parliamentary elections but 
prevents major opposition groups from contesting seats should not be considered a 
“flawed democracy” as though its leaders sought genuine democratic reform.  
The same is true of efforts to maximize civilian control over the military. A 
civilian government may be able to increase its control of the military through ostensibly 
democratic means such as constitutional reform and legislative oversight (what 
Huntington would call “subjective control” and Stepan would call a reduction in military 
prerogatives), but if such methods are not complemented by broader democratic reforms, 
it may be inaccurate or misleading to describe such changes as an increase in democratic 
civilian control. In some cases, democratic reform reflects a genuine commitment to 
democratization while in others it is merely a fig leaf meant to legitimize the 
marginalization of the military and disguise the civilian-led government’s authoritarian 
tendencies or ulterior motives. The difficulty in assessing the intent behind any particular 
democratic reform effort means that CMR frameworks premised on democratic 
institutional controls are, at best, an incomplete guide for evaluating the relationship 
between the armed forces and the state. In Iran, Turkey, and Egypt, Islamist leaders have 
attempted to implement at least some military reforms under a banner of 
democratization—yet these governments’ commitment to democratization is questionable 
at best. Indeed, the banner of democratization can often be a false flag, as evidenced by 
the case of military reform in Iran. Although the mullahs initially stood with non-Islamist 
opponents of the Shah in pledging to democratize the force, they ultimately abandoned 
this pledge and instead imposed a rigid indoctrination program on the conventional force 
and re-assigned many national security responsibilities to the ideological IRGC. 
Proponents of security sector reform (SSR) have demonstrated an awareness of 
these potential pitfalls and have called for a whole-of-government approach to CMR 
 27 
reform. SSR advocates emphasize the importance of coupling military reform with other 
elements of the security apparatus including law enforcement, corrections, intelligence 
services, border management, customs, the judiciary, legislative bodies, and civil society 
groups.48 The concept of SSR has gained significant traction in recent years, winning 
adherents in a variety of organizations, including the United Nations, U.S. State 
Department, and the United States Institute of Peace (USIP). While these efforts are a 
positive development for democracy and human rights advocates, SSR remains at present 
a concept with far more utility for practitioners than for scholars. SSR lacks explanatory 
power; it is a prescription, not a diagnosis.  
Moreover, the implication that democratization and civilian control of the military 
move in tandem is both inaccurate and misleading. The experiences of the Muslim 
Middle East over the last several decades have demonstrated that the reverse may in fact 
be more common. In post-revolutionary Iran and in AKP-run Turkey, civilian leaders 
have maximized their control over the military while weakening the state’s democratic 
institutions. This is not to suggest that the process of democratization is irrelevant to 
studies of CMR. On the contrary, the presence or absence of democratic institutions is a 
vital part of whether and how civilian leaders attempt to reform CMR. However, it is 
impossible to assess CMR in Islamist states without understanding CMR trends in non-
democracies. 
C. CMR IN NON-DEMOCRACIES 
While efforts to understand democratic forms of CMR have yielded volumes of 
fine-grained analysis, the same cannot be said of non-democratic approaches to CMR. 
Scholars have generally refrained from evaluating CMR across the spectrum of non-
democratic regimes, preferring instead to limit comparative studies to specific contexts, 
such as the juntas of Latin America or Southeast Asia. This imbalance in favor of 
democratic studies of CMR almost certainly owes to the democratization-CMR 
convergence. The field of CMR is flooded with books that emphasize change and 
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transition in CMR. The titles of such books almost invariably include words like 
“reform,” “transform,” “transition,” and “fixing.” In this frenzy to describe ideal CMR 
arrangements and anticipate the pitfalls of transition, detailed exploration of how CMR 
evolve in non-democracies gets lost. 
Although detailed and comprehensive analyses of non-democratic CMR may be 
lacking, most analysts at least acknowledge the power of non-democratic control 
mechanisms. Samuel Finer notes that in “despotisms and autocracies of a totalitarian 
type…the military are subordinated to the civilians as much as or even more than in the 
liberal-democratic regimes.”49 Huntington goes a step further by identifying some 
specific methods for non-democratic control: 
In a totalitarian regime…the power of the military may be reduced by 
breaking the officer corps up into competing units, establishing party 
armies and special military forces (Waffen-SS and MVD), infiltrating the 
military hierarchy with independent chains of command (political 
commissars), and similar techniques. Terror, conspiracy, surveillance, and 
force are the means by which the civilians in such a state control their 
armed forces.50 
Such techniques, which have often proven ruthlessly effective even if only for short 
durations, are not restricted to totalitarian regimes as Huntington implies. One can find 
similar approaches in other non-democratic regimes, including sultanistic regimes in the 
Middle East throughout the twentieth century. However, these approaches to controlling 
the military are most pronounced in ideological regimes, where civilian leaders seem to 
be least afraid of using harsh techniques to subdue the force.  
1. CMR in Ideological Regimes 
Martin Seliger defines ideology as “Sets of ideas by which men posit, explain and 
justify ends and means of organized social action, and specifically political action, 
irrespective of whether such action aims to preserve, amend, uproot or rebuild a given 
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social order.”51 The two elements captured by Seliger’s definition that most clearly 
distinguish ideological regimes from other patterns of rule are “[s]ets of ideas” and 
“organized social action.” The extent to which these characteristics prove mutually 
supportive can help explain why some ideologies endure for decades while others lose 
their ability to inspire political action within only a few short years. Social and political 
actions that reflect the values of a particular ideology are far more likely to succeed than 
those that seem driven by purely political considerations. Successful ideological 
mobilizations tend to demonstrate revolutionary aims focused not only on establishing 
political control over the machinery of the state but on extending influence over all 
aspects of social and cultural life.52 This is most often accomplished through a 
disciplined political organization (such as a party) that tends to be both the exemplar of 
ideological values and the instrument through which they are imposed on the state. In 
extreme cases the distinction between the party and the state can disappear altogether as 
all instruments of the state—including the military—become members and defenders of 
the party.  
Although Huntington placed ideology at the center of his theory of CMR, his 
treatment of the subject leaves much to be desired.53 Huntington renders ideology the 
sole province of the civilian realm and suggests that the military is impermeable to its 
influence. By his definition all militaries have an “ethic” that is “concrete, permanent, 
and universal.”54 Militaries cannot have a unique ideology of their own, nor can their 
values be affected by the dominant ideology of the state. Huntington’s notion of a 
universal interpretation of military professionalism does not, however, mirror reality. The 
Turkish military’s commitment to Kemalism, for example, has long superseded its 
commitment to the state’s elected civilian leaders; it is impossible to argue that the 
                                                 
51 Martin Seliger, Ideology and Politics (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1977). 11. See also John 
Gerring, “Ideology: A Definitional Analysis,” Political Research Quarterly 50, No. 4, December 1997. 
52 For example, the Iraq-centered pan-Arabism championed by the Ba’ath Party after 1968 sought to 
highlight the country’s unique Mesopotamic history through education reform, the adoption of new 
folkloric traditions, and even state funding for archaeological excavations. Amatzia Baram, Culture, 
History, and Ideology in the Formation of Ba’thist Iraq, 1968–1989 (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1991).  
53 Huntington, Soldier and the State, 90. 
54 Ibid., 89. 
 30 
Turkish armed forces’ understanding of “professionalism” has always been the same as, 
for instance, the American military’s. In Iran, the Revolutionary Guards’ internalization 
of velayat-e faqih has had a similar effect: the Guards have become the dominant force in 
politics and society in a manner that seems to preserve rather than challenge the clerical 
leadership and the ideology of the state.  
a. Indoctrination 
Indoctrination is a critical part of the legitimization strategy for ideological 
regimes. Soviet Russia brought indoctrination into primary schools, “instill[ing] in youth 
a sense of nationalism, militarism, and readiness for war…on a scale unprecedented in 
peacetime.”55 Communist leaders in North Vietnam and North Korea similarly made 
indoctrination in Marxist-Leninist ideology a core part of basic education; the latter using 
ideology to legitimize the use of child labor to offset the negative effects of the country’s 
labor shortage.56 Indoctrinating the military is often the most critical short-term goal as 
the military typically poses the most immediate and significant threat to the regime. 
Civilian leaders seek to force the military to accept the legitimacy of the civilians’ right 
to rule as part of the new ideology of the state. This idea is central to Mao Tse-Tung’s 
assertion that “Power grows out of the barrel of the gun. Our principle is that the party 
controls the gun and the gun shall never be allowed to command the party.”57 
Huntington’s definition of military “professionalism,” with its emphasis on the 
distinctiveness and universality of the military ethic, fails to capture the essence of Mao’s 
assertion. Rather than being an intrinsic element of the military ethos, Mao and others 
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viewed military subordination to the civilian government as inseparable part of the 
ideology of the state, and something that had to be taught to military leaders.58  
b. Mass Purges 
Purging the military of potentially dissident leaders is common to all types 
of non-democratic regimes regardless of whether or not ideology plays a significant role. 
However, non-ideological regimes are generally less likely to embrace mass purges as a 
technique for asserting control over the military as such regimes often depend on 
relationships built on patronage and personal loyalty that can be threatened by large-scale 
purges. Ideological regimes, however, tend to harbor immense distrust of those who do 
not share their belief their system or share a deep-seated commitment to the dominant 
ideology of the state. It is often the case that instead of viewing the military as agnostic 
toward the ideology of the state, ideological regimes treat the military as either a 
counterrevolutionary threat or one infiltrated by hostile foreign powers. The most 
dramatic example of this was in Stalinist Russia, where nearly one million Red Army 
soldiers stood trial in military courts and 157,000 were sentenced to death during as part 
of the Great Purges of the 1930s.59  
c. New Elite: Secret Police and Political-Ideological Agents  
Secret police and political-ideological agents are not unique to ideological 
regimes; they are common to authoritarian regimes of all stripes and predate the rise of 
Islamist governments in all three of the countries examined in this thesis. Nor are the 
methods that such organizations employ necessarily more or less brutal in ideological 
regimes—the SAVAK in Pahlavi’s Iran and Interior Ministry in Mubarak’s Egypt were 
both notorious for the harsh tactics they employed in suppressing internal dissent. Their 
lofty status owes partly to the fact that unlike the military, the internal security services’ 
leadership is “hidden from public view and has little if any chance of winning popular 
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support.”60 Autocratic leaders tend to value this attribute regardless of the ideological 
leanings of the regime or its security personnel. 
In regimes where members of the intelligence and security apparatus are 
fully indoctrinated in the dominant ideology of the state, the security services tend to 
acquire a vast array of ancillary responsibilities in addition to regular stability support 
and repression of domestic dissent. In the Soviet Union, for example, the NKVD evolved 
from a loosely organized association of thugs and strongmen in 1917 to the largest secret 
police service in world history within a span of ten years, to a highly effective 
organization tasked with most of the USSR’s most sensitive missions, including 
intelligence collection on the U.S. weapons systems, oversight of the Soviet nuclear 
program, monitoring and prosecuting suspected spies (including those within the Red 
Army), and management of up to nine percent of the country’s industrial production by 
the 1950s.61 Members of these organizations are not, however, above reproach. Their 
suspicious governments have often made them the targets of investigation and purges. 
The NKVD itself endured two severe purges during a four-year span in the late 1930s.62 
Nevertheless, these security organizations are generally the prize pupils of ideological 
regimes and have been favored above the military and entrusted with the state’s highest 
priority missions.  
2. CMR in Authoritarian and Sultanistic Regimes 
Unlike highly ideological regimes that thrive on mobilizing supporters around a 
particular, ideal vision of the state, authoritarian regimes are:  
political systems with limited, not responsible, political pluralism, without 
elaborate and guiding ideology, but with distinctive mentalities, without 
extensive nor intensive political mobilization, except at some points in 
their development, and in which a leader or occasionally a small group 
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exercises power within formally ill-defined limits but actually quite 
predictable ones.63 
Linz’s definition for authoritarianism is supposed to offer a marked contrast with 
sultanism as defined by Max Weber. According to Weber, sultanism is a pattern of 
control that arises:  
whenever traditional domination develops an administration and a military 
force which are purely personal instruments of the master…[Sultanism] is 
not, however, rationalized in impersonal terms, but consists only in the 
extreme development of the ruler’s discretion.64 
While the highly personalized nature of authority in a sultanistic regime is an important 
distinction, the notion that authoritarian regimes operate within generally “predictable” 
limits while sultanistic rulers exercise their authority in a more unpredictable and 
arbitrary manner is debatable. Indeed, the Arab monarchies that exemplify the personal 
rulership of the sultanistic regime tend to rule in extraordinarily predictable patterns—
perhaps more so than the political leaders in the region whose authority derives, at least 
in theory, from non-traditional, non-familial factors. Furthermore, many regimes bear a 
strong resemblance to both types. Mubarak-era Egypt, for example, coupled the limited 
plurality of authoritarianism with the intensely personal exercise of authority and 
nepotism of sultanistic regimes.  
For the purposes of this analysis, a firm distinction between authoritarianism and 
sultanism is not essential. What is important is a clear understanding of the features the 
two regimes types share in common. Specifically, neither sultanistic nor authoritarian 
regimes are strictly constrained by a dominant ideology. Sultanistic regimes are designed 
to protect and enhance the authority of an individual ruler without striving to effect any 
broader transformation of society. Authoritarian regimes are similarly structured in that 
their primary aim is to preserve stability rather than to pursue any utopian or 
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transformational goals. Although authoritarian regimes might be influenced by general 
principles that Linz describes as “mentalities,” these do not comprise a concrete vision of 
the state and are generally incapable of mobilizing the population or influencing 
institutional design. According to Linz, mentalities are “difficult to diffuse to the masses, 
less susceptible to be used in education, less likely to come into conflict with religion or 
science and more difficult to use as a test of loyalty.”65 Consequently, the logic of 
authority in both sultanistic and authoritarian regimes is far more transactional. Both 
types of rulers are forced to maintain the loyalty of subordinates through a mixture of 
patronage and coercion, often paving the way to cronyism. This is why it is more 
common for militaries in authoritarian and sultanistic regimes to dominate major 
industries and business sectors, benefit from exclusive government contracts, and acquire 
government employment after retirement than in ideological or totalitarian regimes. 
D. THE RELEVANCE OF CMR THEORY FOR ISLAMIST STATES 
The field of CMR provides a patchwork of ideas and concepts, each of which is 
useful for explaining some, but not all, interactions between the military and the state. 
Islamist states may be authoritarian, but in a way that is distinct from past patterns of 
authoritarianism. They are not totalitarian, though ideology plays a critical role in 
ensuring loyalty. They are not democratic, but democratic principles help Islamist leaders 
establish and maintain control of the military.  
While no single theory can provide a comprehensive explanation of all the civil-
military interactions in a state, Feaver’s principal-agent model is probably the most useful 
for this examination. As the three Islamist movements examined in this thesis have 
struggled to balance their efforts to establish control over the military against a need to 
expand or preserve their own legitimacy, their decisions are best understood in terms of 
risk and reward. From the military perspective, the absence of a firm base of civilian 
political support left all three militaries with no recourse for opposing Islamist rule except 
to challenge the civilian leadership itself—a risk that these militaries have generally 
considered too high to their own long-term interests. The reluctance of these three 
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militaries to openly oppose their Islamist civilian leaders owes less to a Huntingtonian 
sense of “professionalism” and more to a cognizance of their own political constraints. 
The Iranian military was never popular enough to challenge Khomeini even as the clerics 
began to feud with liberal reformers. the Turkish military’s failed “e-coup” in 2007 cost 
the generals precious political capital and prevented them from attempting another 
intervention even amidst highly controversial investigations left have placed many flag 
officers behind bars. And the decline in popular support for the Egyptian military that 
occurred over the course of the SCAF’s tenure as the country’s supreme political body 
has led to a tentative peace with Morsi’s government and the Muslim Brothers.  
Of course, how the civilian and military actors perceive risk and opportunity and 
attempt to assert their authority is determined to a large degree by historical and 
institutional legacies, which is why it is vital to examine the pre-Islamist history of CMR 
in the region.  
 
 36 






III. PRE-ISLAMIST TRENDS IN MIDDLE EAST CMR 
A. SULTANISM, AUTHORITARIANISM, AND THE LEGACY OF 
TRANSACTIONAL POLITICS 
The question that lies at the heart of this analysis is whether Islamism’s rise 
portends a radical transformation for CMR in the Middle East or is merely the latest 
incarnation of the sultanistic and authoritarian trends that have characterized CMR for 
decades. As is usually the case with these sorts of questions, the truth probably lies 
somewhere in between. Islamist governments have been swept into power in Iran, 
Turkey, and Egypt in part because they derive their influence and legitimacy from 
sources that had abandoned their predecessors in each state. Yet Islamist governments 
have adopted many of the same non-democratic practices that were utilized by the 
sultanistic and authoritarian governments that preceded them, which suggests that 
Islamism does not represent a wholly new or distinct approach to government. To 
understand the CMR developments in Islamist states today, it is necessary to place them 
within the broader context of regional CMR practices of the past several decades. 
Comparative analyses of CMR in the Middle East have helped identify several key 
features and patterns of interaction that set the region apart from others around the world. 
Although many of the best assessments are starting to show their age, many of the trends 
and patterns identified here have echoes in the Islamist order of the present.  
1. Arab Sultanism and its Impact on CMR 
In Political-Military Relations and the Stability of Arab Regimes, Risa Brooks 
identifies several trends in Arab CMR interactions in the late twentieth century. These 
include an expansion of a non-military support base “by cultivating social, economic, and 
religious groups”; securing the loyalty of the military’s high command and officer corps 
with both corporate and individual benefits; appeasing privileged minority groups with 
appointments to key government posts; and weakening potential political challengers 
through “extensive monitoring and purges.”66  
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Although Brooks’ analysis is restricted to Arab states and pre-dates the Arab 
Spring revolutions, Brooks’ observations remain relevant for explaining CMR in Islamist 
states today for two reasons. First, the weaknesses and excesses of this system of rule 
provided Islamists with an opening. The corruption and cronyism characteristic of 
sultanistic and authoritarian regimes tends to generate popular resentment. Islamists in 
Iran, Tunisia, Egypt, and elsewhere have all managed to capitalize on this resentment and 
have come to power in part because of their promises to curb corruption—particularly 
that associated with the military. Second, many of the tactics and strategies adopted by 
Islamist rulers appear to be patterned—consciously or not—after the behavior of Arab 
autocrats. For example, there are great similarities between the military’s economic might 
in Mubarak’s Egypt and the IRGC’s domination of the Iranian economy.67 Similarly, the 
Islamist-led purges of senior military leaders in Iran, Turkey, and to a lesser extent Egypt 
are hardly without precedent: since the 1950s, similar purges have taken place in Syria, 
Jordan, Iraq, and Nasser-era Egypt.68 
Of course, the decline of sultanism in the Middle East long predates the rise of 
Islamism. The collapse of sultanistic regimes in Iran, Tunisia, and Egypt likely would 
have occurred with or without Islamist organizations. Even the monarchies have begun to 
show signs of strain: most have made concessions to democratic institutions and 
processes in recent years. For example, in Jordan’s King Abdullah II agreed to transfer 
new powers to the country’s democratically-elected parliament in January 2013, 
including the right to select its own prime minister. Whether the move reflects a genuine 
commitment to democratic reform or is merely a token gesture meant to appease political 
opponents may be beside the point: what is significant is that the King has become 
sensitive to popular pressure to reform—a clear indication of the declining power of 
sultanism.  
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2. Patterns of Interaction: Democracies, Inclusionary States, 
Exclusionary States, and Monarchies 
While sultanism was the predominant form of government in the late-twentieth 
century Middle East, this should not suggest that CMR were identical in every state 
across the region. On the contrary, the states of the region have demonstrated significant 
variations in their approaches CMR—a reflection of several different social, economic, 
and political development factors. In a 2000 comparative analysis, Mehran Kamrava 
identifies four distinct “patterns of interaction” that characterize the relationship between 
civilian rulers and their instruments of coercion in the region: democratic states in which 
the military is assigned a substantial role in domestic politics through a constitutional or 
other lawful mandate (Turkey), “inclusionary states” that rely on ideological militias to 
compete with the regular military and stifle its political ambitions (Iran), “exclusionary 
states” that have transformed once-ideological military officers into “civilian autocrats” 
(Mubarak-era Egypt), and small monarchies that rely on foreign forces to provide 
security (the GCC states).69  
Kamrava rightfully describes these as ideal types, acknowledging that civil-
military interactions in many states often bear a strong resemblance to two or more 
categories. However, it is not so much the limitations inherent in such categorization that 
pose the greatest challenge to his framework; rather, it is the tremendous political 
changes that have swept through the region in the thirteen years since he first published 
the article. Indeed, many of the countries discussed in the piece no longer seem to fit the 
descriptions of the categories they were assigned. The pattern of Islamist CMR that has 
emerged in Iran, Turkey, and arguably in post-Mubarak Egypt seems to be an 
amalgamation of the democratic and inclusionary typologies. In all three countries, 
regular national elections and elements of democratic civilian control over the armed 
forces seem to fit Kamrava’s description of the democratic pattern. The immense 
privileges afforded to the military are not simply symptoms of a corrupt sultanistic state; 
rather, they are often institutionalized procedures that have been legitimized by law, 
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code, and custom. Yet the inclusionary pattern also seems to hold. Rumors of deep 
Islamist penetration of the National Police in Turkey (as well as the legal system) suggest 
that the country’s civilian leaders may be trying to use their Islamist allies as a bulwark 
against the military in a manner consistent with the inclusionary model. On the other 
hand, the influence of the IRGC in Iran has become so pronounced that it would not be a 
stretch to describe Iran as an exclusionary state. Post-Mubarak Egypt, meanwhile, can no 
longer be appropriately considered an exclusionary state; however, to call Egypt a 
democratic or inclusionary regime seems equally unsatisfying.  
3. Military Dominance: Ruling but Not Governing 
Writing in 2007, Steven Cook found parallels in the logic of authority in Turkey, 
Algeria, and Egypt. While all three had democratic elements, none could rightfully be 
considered a democratic regime. In Turkey and Algeria, the military had long prevented 
the rise of would-be sultanistic rulers, while in Egypt, Mubarak’s control over the 
military appeared to be less than sultanistic. In all three, Cook described the military as 
“ruling but not governing,” an arrangement whereby the military is able to maximize its 
political influence while avoiding the day-to-day business of government. Cook describes 
all three as “military-dominated regime,” a term meant to distinguish the Middle Eastern 
militaries from the generals who led “military dictatorships” in Latin America and 
Asia.70 While the latter witnessed their legitimacy erode because of their inability to 
govern effectively, the “military-dominated regimes” of the Middle East faced no such 
pressure as the responsibility to govern still fell to civilian leaders who were unable or 
unwilling to rein in the military. In other words, the Algerian, Turkish, and Egyptian 
militaries enjoyed all of the benefits associated with running a state without shouldering 
any of the responsibility.   
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4. The Role of pre-Islamist Political Ideologies  
The absence of a unifying or mobilizing ideology in many Middle Eastern 
regimes hindered many autocratic rulers’ ability to effect change, which almost certainly 
contributed to their collapse in authority. As Linz writes, 
Such regimes pay a price for their lack of ideology in our sense of the 
term. It limits their capacity to mobilize people to create the psychological 
and emotional  identification of the masses with the regime. The absence 
of an articulate ideology, of a sense of ultimate meaning, of long-run 
purposes, of an a priori model of ideal society reduces the attractiveness of 
such regimes to those for whom ideas, meaning, and values are central.71 
Yet when analyzing politics of the Middle East during the twentieth century, one cannot 
ignore the role that ideologies like Arab socialism, Kemalism, and Ba’athism had on 
institutional development. This apparent contradiction can be partly resolved by recalling 
that sultanism and authoritarianism, like all social and political science concepts, refer to 
ideal types, and that reality has a tendency to poke holes in such constructs. A more 
complete explanation is that ideology tended to ebb and flow over the course of the 
twentieth century. The failure of Middle Eastern political leaders to fully commit to a 
particular ideology and remake the institutions in accordingly led many ideological 
regimes to descend back into authoritarian or sultanistic patterns of control. This 
tendency helps explain why despite the periodic emergence of radical ideologies, no 
Middle Eastern state evolved into a true totalitarian regime. According to Linz, political 
mobilizations based on ideology often play a role “at some points in [authoritarian 
regime] development,” without culminating in a true, one-party state.72  
Prior to the emergence of Islamism, the most successful efforts to bring the 
military into this mobilizational effort were likely in Kemalist Turkey and Ba’athist Iraq. 
From the time they are cadets at the military academy, Turkish military officers are 
continually told that, “Your ideology will be [Ataturk’s] principles, your aim will be the 
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discretion he showed us. You will follow unswervingly in Ataturk’s footsteps.”73 The six 
principles (or “arrows”) of Kemalism—Republicanism, Populism, Secularism, 
Revolutionism, Nationalism, and Statism—form a core part of the military officer’s 
education in Turkey. Of course, it is not difficult to understand why Kemalism resonates 
with Turkish officers, who are also often told that they “constitute the unshakable 
foundation of the state.”74 As will be discussed in Chapter V, this belief fundamentally 
shapes the military’s view of civilian leaders and has been used to justify its periodic 
interventions into politics.  
Saddam Hussein’s program to indoctrinate the military in Ba’athist ideology, on 
the other hand, was far more coercive and reflected a fear and hostility towards the 
military borne out of the failure of the Ba’athists’ first attempt to seize power as well as 
Saddam Hussein’s own personal experience with the military.75 Saddam pushed forward 
a program to transform the military into al jaysh al-’aqidi (“ideological army”), by 
establishing a Party Military Bureau and Directorate of Political Guidance to spread the 
ideology of pan-Arabism, indoctrinate members with the principles of the July 17th 
Revolution, and supervise the political activities of military officers.76 Although 
Hussein’s later efforts to weaken the Ba’ath Party and exert more direct and personal 
control over the armed forces eroded the ideological power of Ba’athism and brought 
Iraqi CMR closer to a sultanistic pattern of control, the first ten to twenty years of CMR 
in Saddam Hussein’s Iraq serve as a good example of how ideology can be used to 
restrict the military’s autonomy so severely that its leaders are incapable of perceiving the 
military’s interests as distinct from those of the ruling regime. 
Ideological regimes that do not attempt to indoctrinate the military are far likelier 
to descend into transactional patterns of interaction and control. Egypt never attempted to 
impose an indoctrination program on its armed forces comparable to those of Ba’athist 
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Iraq or Kemalist Turkey. As Hazem Kandil writes, this is because the “Nasser had no 
political revolutionary party to keep the military in check. His chief revolutionary party 
organization was none other than the military itself.”77 Nasser did not make a serious 
effort to indoctrinate the military in his vision of Arab socialism until more than a decade 
after the 1952 revolution. Although he established a 30,000 member Vanguard 
Organization (VO) to carry out this mission in the mid-1960s, the VO was led by security 
officers with little knowledge of how to inspire ideological thinking. The VO neglected 
its education mission and became instead “a giant security edifice centered on 
surveillance and political control.”78 The absence of ideological control over the military 
in Egypt set in motion a pattern of control whereby the country’s civilian leaders—from 
Nasser through Mubarak—relied solely on instruments of patronage and coercion. The 
security apparatus charged with monitoring the military was thus focused only on 
identifying possible subversives rather than ensuring ideological cohesion.  
B. ISLAMISM AS IDEOLOGY AND THE IMPLICATIONS FOR CMR 
The point of such comparisons is not to suggest that all Islamist movements are as 
oppressive as Soviet Russia or Maoist China. Rather, it is to demonstrate the correlation 
between ideological cohesion, organizational strength, and a capacity to shape 
institutional development. Islamists in Iran and Turkey have already begun to realize the 
potential of this capacity with respect to CMR, transforming civil-military relations in a 
manner comparable to that of other highly effective ideological mobilizations. Iran and 
Turkey have both undertaken massive purges of the armed forces and have turned to 
trusted agents—whose loyalty owes more to ideological adherence than to patronage—
within the police and security establishment to keep watch over the military. Indeed, the 
IRGC may be the closest relative to the NKVD today as the Guards’ mandate to protect 
the revolution against foreign and domestic threats has been interpreted as broadly as  
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possible to give the organization authority over internal and external security 
responsibilities, intelligence collection, and management of vital (and profitable) state 
industries.  
The organizational strength of Islamist movements in Iran, Turkey, and Egypt 
appears to be greater than that of the Middle Eastern ideologies that preceded them, such 
as Ba’athism and Arab socialism. This is partly due to the prominent role of religion, or 
more accurately religious identity, in social life in the Muslim Middle East. Religious 
identity enables Islamist organizations to gather support at the grassroots level—it is a 
bottom-up movement rather than an elite phenomenon. Yet Islamists should not be 
considered the poor and disenfranchised; Islamist movements often win the support of 
those in the middle- and upper-middle classes, including professionals and business 
leaders. Rather than seeking to attain political power first, Islamist organizations often set 
their sights lower, investing in schools, businesses, and hospitals. This enables Islamist 
organizations to amass significant resources in terms of both human capital and material 
support long before they ever attempt to challenge for political power.  
The organizational strength of Islamist movements also reflects the legacies of 
persecution and political isolation that each has faced at the hands of hostile 
governments. In Iran, Turkey, and Egypt, political repression not only failed to destroy 
the Islamist organization, but inspired greater cohesion among its members. In Turkey 
and Egypt, repression compelled members to refine their beliefs, which in turn made it 
easier for the organizations to inspire and mobilize supporters. This tendency is most 
pronounced in Egypt where more than 80 years of political persecution forced the 
Brotherhood to develop an elaborate recruiting and indoctrination program to ensure the 
commitment of its members. Yet one can find evidence of this in Iran and Turkey as well. 
Khomeini was arrested by the Shah’s leaders and spent several years in exile, and the 
Shah’s secret police (SAVAK) were notorious for their persecution of dissident clerics 
and efforts to control religious institutions during the 1970s.79 In Turkey, the military has 
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a long history of undermining Islamist political organizations and Erdogan himself 
famously spent four months in prison in 1997 for allegedly inciting religious hatred by 
reading a poem that included religious imagery. Fethullah Gülen has lived in self-
imposed exile since 1999, when a government investigation into his movement 
intensified.80  
In all three cases, political repression has led Islamists to adopt a veil of secrecy. 
How each movement is organized and makes decisions remain largely unknown. In 
Turkey and Egypt, accusations of secret Islamist infiltration of the military and security 
services have become common and religiosity seems to be a prerequisite for appointment 
to most government posts. In essence, ideological and organizational strength have 
become reciprocating factors. 
Although the institutional legacies of Sultanism and military dominance continue 
to loom large in Iran, Turkey, and particularly in Egypt, the mobilizational power of 
Islamism has re-shaped many aspects of CMR and state development in general. Whether 
Islamism is able to endure for decades or follows a path similar to that of Iraqi Ba’athism 
or Arab Socialism likely depends on its ability to articulate a clear vision for the state and 
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IV. CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS IN IRAN 
A. INTRODUCTION 
By the standards of traditional CMR models like Huntington’s, the Islamic 
Republic of Iran would appear to be exemplary case on the basis of regime stability. Iran 
has not experienced frequent, overt military interventions into politics in the same way as 
its neighbors like Pakistan and Turkey. In the three-plus decades since the Islamic 
Revolution toppled the government of Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, the Islamic 
Republic’s leaders appear to have brought the armed forces to heel, and Iranian scholars 
maintain that the probability of a coup attempt, let alone a successful one, is “low to 
vanishing.”81 While the regime’s control of the armed forces may be effective, its control 
mechanisms are not the democratic ones prescribed by normative CMR models. Instead, 
civilian control of the armed forces in Iran derives primarily from the regime’s ability to 
exploit divisions within elements of the coercive services—divisions that in many ways 
reflect the intense factionalization of the regime itself.  
The most important example of this is the rapidly expanding influence of the 
Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) over the past two decades. Although the 
IRGC remains a smaller force in terms of total manpower than the conventional military 
forces, it has assumed formal control of critical national security programs like Iran’s 
ballistic missile force and allegedly its nascent nuclear capability.82 At the same time, the 
IRGC has become more politicized as current and former IRGC officers have increased 
their control over the Iranian economy and secured a growing share of elected and 
appointed political positions. Yet the IRGC’s growing power does not appear to threaten 
regime stability; rather, it remains intimately connected to the legitimacy of the Supreme 
Leader. The IRGC’s rise has been made possible by Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali  
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Khamenei and his allies in order to weaken political opponents within the ruling elite as 
well as real and perceived threats from political activists and the conventional military 
forces. 
The co-dependent relationship between the IRGC and the Supreme Leader is the 
defining feature of CMR in Iran today. In order to understand how this unique 
relationship came about, it is necessary to review the critical developments in the 
evolution of Iranian CMR, dating back to the creation of a unified military force under 
the Shah. 
B. CMR IN PRE-REVOLUTIONARY IRAN 
The collapse of Mohammad Reza Pahlavi’s government in 1979 came as major 
surprise to most in the West. Just one year before he fled the country, U.S. President 
Jimmy Carter famously toasted the Shah’s leadership and trumpeted Iran as an “island of 
stability” in the Middle East. Carter’s comments reflected the wisdom of the time; the 
Shah’s political opponents appeared too factionalized to pose any significant threat to the 
monarchy and the military appeared extremely loyal and disciplined. At the time of the 
Revolution, the Shah’s military was the fifth largest in the world and the most capable in 
the region.83  But for all of its alleged strength, the Shah’s military was insecure, 
fractious, and deeply unpopular with the Iranian public, which tended to view the armed 
forces as an instrument of the Shah rather than the guarantor of national security.84   
To some extent, skepticism of the Shah and his military was a reflection of 
deeply-rooted historical issues. Before the Pahlavi Dynasty, Iran never had a “unified 
military establishment under national control.”85 For centuries, Iran’s military forces had 
been undisciplined units marginally organized at the tribal level. At the dawn of the 
twentieth century, European commanders began to assume responsibility for organizing 
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and training these units at the behest of the crown, ostensibly to improve protection for 
the regime. Although some units undoubtedly became more technically skilled, overall 
these foreign-trained forces developed a reputation for placing “the interests of their own 
respective countries above those of the Iranian monarch.”86 One of these units, the 
Russian-trained Cossack Brigade, launched a coup against the Qajar dynasty in 1921—
the only successful coup in modern Iranian history. Five years after the coup, one of the 
Cossack’s senior commanders, Colonel Reza Khan, installed himself as king. Reza Shah 
made the military a central part of his regime, consolidating the armed forces into a 
singular national entity. The Allied invasion of Iran in 1941 exposed the weakness of this 
military and forced the Shah to abdicate the throne. However, when Reza Shah’s son 
Mohammed Reza assumed power, he followed in his father’s footsteps, making the 
military his top priority.  
At the end of the war, Mohammed Reza Shah aligned himself closely with 
Washington, managing to secure substantial American assistance in order to rebuild and 
strengthen a unified, national military force. The U.S.-backed overthrow of Prime 
Minister Mohammad Mosaddegh in 1953 furthered popular perceptions that the Shah and 
his military were more interested in protecting the interests of their powerful foreign 
supporters than the Iranian people, a notion that Mossadegh himself tried to exploit 
during his trial.87 
The more proximate causes of the Shah’s downfall relate to his own 
mismanagement of the military, particularly the senior officer corps. The Shah made 
himself indispensible, ensuring that even routine military matters were routed through 
him. He adopted a “divide and rule” approach designed to disrupt horizontal 
communications and encourage rivalry among key factions and leaders. In short, his  
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leadership style “rewarded sycophancy and submission and punished independence of 
mind, constructive criticism, and truthfulness.”88 The military was ill-prepared to handle 
a crisis as complex as the 1978 uprising.  
As the anti-Shah coalition gained momentum and demonstrations grew violent, 
senior military officers did little to protect the regime and the lower-ranking personnel 
who comprised the bulk of the force sympathized with and in some cases openly declared 
their support for the opposition.89 Within weeks of the Shah’s decision to flee the 
country—a decision he thought would last only as long as it took the military to regain 
control of the country and return him to power—the military declared its neutrality, 
allowing the opposition to dispatch with the Shah’s hastily-formed interim government 
and install its own Provisional Revolutionary Government (PRG) to draft a new 
constitution for an Islamic Republic.90 
C. CMR UNDER KHOMEINI 
The uprising that culminated with the Shah’s ouster in January 1979 was not an 
exclusively religious phenomenon. On the contrary, the anti-Shah coalition represented 
an array of interests, ranging from secular democratic reformers, members of the 
intelligentsia, Marxists, organized labor, and the Mojahedin.91 As “no single group had 
the resources or the power to dethrone the Pahlavis,” the Revolution’s leaders kept their 
intentions vague to avoid alienating their allies.92 The most influential and adept of these 
opposition leaders was Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, whose shrewd political 
maneuvering catapulted him to the forefront of the movement despite remaining outside 
the country until after the Shah’s departure.  
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1. Consolidating Political Control 
Once their initial goal had been achieved, the disparate groups that comprised the 
opposition began competing with one another for control of the country’s political fate, 
primarily through the 30-member PRG.93 Infighting left the PRG “hamstrung” and 
unable to exert much influence over a country in “chaos.”94 Khomeini and his allies 
capitalized on this opportunity, establishing control over ad hoc neighborhood 
committees (komites) that had emerged during the crisis. Through the komites, the clerics 
created new parastate institutions like the Revolutionary Courts that would ultimately be 
used to help purge the regular military’s officer corps and a 4,000-member paramilitary 
force that would eventually become the IRGC.95 These efforts, which were designed to 
restore law and order whilst solidifying the clerics’ authority were enhanced and 
legitimized by a wave of Shia populism borne out of popular frustration with the Shah’s 
decadence and the impotence of the PRG. Popular support for the clerics enabled 
Khomeini’s allies to dominate the first critical election of the post-Revolution period: the 
competition for seats in the 77-member Assembly of Experts (AOE).96  
Following the elections, the AOE’s first task was to review a draft constitution 
developed by the PRG; however, the AOE essentially re-wrote the document around the 
principle of velayat-e faqih, or rule by the supreme jurist, maximizing the political power 
of the clerical elite in general and Khomeini in particular.97 The final version, approved 
in December 1979, made the Supreme Leader the most powerful figure in the Republic, 
granting him control over the armed forces (including the conventional military and the 
nascent IRGC), the right to declare war, the authority to approve or reject presidential and 
legislative candidates, and even dismiss a seated president. The constitution also 
established a 12-member Council of Guardians comprised of six Islamic jurists appointed 
by the Supreme Leader and six legal scholars appointed by the legislature charged with 
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determining whether legislation passed by the legislature was compliant with both the 
Constitution and Islamic law and given the authority to approve or reject all candidates 
for elected office.   
a. Khomeini’s Vision of the State 
If secular reformers failed to anticipate the radical changes favored by the 
clerical elite, it is not because Khomeini was coy about his intentions. On the contrary, 
Khomeini had outlined his vision of an Islamist state in a series of lectures that were 
published and disseminated in Iran almost a decade prior to the revolution. In the 
lectures, Khomeini argues forcefully that because Islam is a “comprehensive religion” 
that governs every aspect of human life, a government for an Islamic society should be 
based exclusively on Islamic teachings.98 Khomeini derides Iran’s monarchy and 
constitutional republics as un-Islamic and, insisting that “Islamic government does not 
correspond to any of the existing forms of governments,” calls for a “planning body” of 
Islamic scholars to replace the legislature because “the legislative power and competence 
to establish laws belongs exclusively to God Almighty.”99 Khomeini also argues that the 
effort to establish an Islamic Republic should be carried out openly by the clerical elite: 
“If we want to form an Islamic government, then we must do it in our cloaks and turbans; 
otherwise we commit an offense against decency and justice.”100  
Khomeini’s view of the military follows a similar logic. While he makes 
no secret of his contempt for the Shah’s military, describing “the apparel of a soldier” as 
“incompatible with true manliness and justice,”101 he retains high esteem for the military 
profession, noting that “the leaders of our religion were all soldiers, commanders, and 
warriors.”102 This attitude was reflected in the reforms imposed on the Iranian armed 
forces post-1979. Long before the revolution, Khomeini’s speeches foreshadowed the 
decimation of the force most closely affiliated with the ancien régime and the elevation 
                                                 
98 Khomeini, Islam and Revolution, 28. 
99 Ibid., 55. 
100 Ibid., 35. 
101 Ibid., 35. 
102 Ibid., 35. 
 53 
of new, more righteous force unburdened by the past and created specifically to serve the 
Islamist revolution. Yet these pre-revolutionary statements did not amount to a 
comprehensive plan for reform. Rather, the changes to the structure and composition of 
the military that followed the revolution were all implemented in an ad hoc fashion as 
Iran’s new political elite, headed by the Ayatollah, began to gain a sense its newfound 
powers and responded to perceived threats.  
2. Regular Military: Purge and Preserve 
The extraordinary powers bestowed on Khomeini and the clerics were anathema 
to many within the opposition who had sought a more democratic revolution. 
Nevertheless, the transition was kept on track primarily because the would-be democratic 
reformers considered a Khomeini-led theocratic government preferable to military rule or 
the return of the Shah. The pervasive distrust of the military, which persisted long after 
the Shah’s departure, prompted some within the opposition to suggest that the military’s 
declaration of neutrality was merely a “tactical deception” designed to buy the armed 
forces time to regroup and undermine the post-Shah government.103  Many even called 
for the wholesale dissolution of the military.104  
Khomeini, however, remained cognizant of the need for a force capable of 
responding to internal and external threats and sought to preserve the military while 
ensuring its loyalty to the new regime. To do this, Khomeini purged the officer corps of 
all individuals considered a threat to regime and introduced new methods of 
indoctrination designed to “Islamize” the force.105 While the initial phase of purges that 
took place during the summer of 1979 was aimed only at a “handful of top military 
personnel” closely associated with the Shah’s regime, subsequent phases during the early 
1980s would ultimately reduce the officer corps by 40 to 60 percent.106 To ensure loyalty 
of the remaining officers, the regime established the Ideological-Political Directorate 
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(IPD) within every branch of military service. The IPD, which was made up of mid-level 
clerics with ties to the administration, was tasked with monitoring officers, ensuring their 
complicity with the tenants of Islam, and providing “advice” on promotions that 
invariably favored officers whose families were connected to the clerical elite.107  
3. War with Iraq and the “Three-Tiered” Force 
The outbreak of war with Iraq in 1980 became the first major challenge for the 
new regime and a slimmed-down military force. The early months did not bode well for 
CMR as the clerics feuded with the Republic’s first president, Abol Hasan Bani Sadr, 
over how to manage the conflict. While Bani Sadr attempted to assert his own authority 
over the regular forces and promote them as the country’s primary fighting force, the 
clerical elite pushed back, seeking to maintain firm control over national security 
instruments and decision-making processes. Khomeini and the clerics wanted the IRGC, 
which had already ballooned from 5,000 men in 1979 to 50,000 in 1981 (and would 
expand further to 150,000 troops by 1983) to lead the war effort.108 The clerics, who 
believed that Bani Sadr harbored “Bonapartist tendencies” and was conspiring to 
overthrow the clerical elite, had Bani Sadr impeached by mid-1981.109  
To prosecute the war, Tehran adopted a “three-tiered structure” that allowed the 
regular forces, IRGC, and a new all-volunteer militia force known as the Basij to 
prosecute the war in a complementary but non-integrated fashion.110 Despite some initial 
successes, the structure collapsed by the end of the conflict as hostility between the 
services grew and military defeats became more frequent. The ineffectiveness of this 
approach during the Iraq war prompted a series of major military reforms that, when 
coupled with the death of Khomeini in 1989, would completely transformed Iranian 
CMR. 
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D. CMR UNDER KHAMENEI 
1. Post-war Reforms 
The post-war military reform effort was led by Majlis Speaker Ali Akbar 
Hashemi Rafsanjani, who would also serve as president from 1989 through 1997. 
Rafsanjani made streamlining the chain of command and reducing friction between the 
IRGC and regular military his top priorities. Rafsanjani created the Ministry of Defense 
and Armed Forces Logistics to exercise administrative control over both military services 
and established a Supreme Council for National Security staffed by all major civilian 
government leaders in order to streamline national security decision-making.111  
For the IRGC, these were not mere bureaucratic changes. The Guards initially 
considered Rafsanjani’s reforms an existential threat capable of eviscerating their 
“identity as a separate entity from the regular army.”112 Their fears were not without 
merit; much of the blame for combat failures of the Iraq war was levied at the IRGC and 
its aggressive commanders.113 Some scholars suggest that Rafsanjani did in fact seek to 
dissolve the IRGC and merge them into the regular forces and that it was Khomeini who 
intervened to keep the Guards as a distinct force.114 Others have rejected this hypothesis, 
and have pointed to Rafsanjani’s public praise for the IRGC in the immediate aftermath 
of the war.115 Whatever the case, the Guards retained their independence and semi-
autonomy, though their “revolutionary” identity began to change in significant ways. 
Rafsanjani and others stressed the importance of professionalizing the force, and in the 
early 1990s the IRGC adopted many of the trappings of a conventional military force, 
such as uniforms and a formal rank structure.116 The rank structure and uniforms 
accompanied other efforts to satisfy the IRGC’s corporate interests, including a new 
emphasis by the civilian leadership on advanced military technology. The IRGC was 
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placed at the forefront of the country’s nascent defense manufacturing industry—a major 
source of national pride for a country eager to reduce its reliance on foreign weapons.117 
Despite the civilian leadership’s emphasis on professionalizing the Guards, it was 
during this period that the IRGC began an “institutional transformation into a network of 
political and economic actors, rather than a purely military institution.”118 The causes 
underlying this transformation are numerous. To some extent, the problem originates 
with the Guards’ nebulous constitutional mandate to guard “the principle of government 
by the supreme jurist and the principle of jihad.”119 The principal cause, however, was 
the change in civilian leadership that followed Khomeini’s death.  
2. Khamenei’s Power and the Rise of the IRGC 
It is important here to note that in spite of the extensive formal powers enjoyed by 
the Supreme Leader under the constitution, informal procedures and relationships and a 
consensus-driven approach to decision-making have been the hallmarks of Iranian 
political leadership. As opposed to dictators in other authoritarian or totalitarian regimes 
whose edicts go largely unchallenged, the Supreme Leader has historically served as an 
“arbiter” negotiating compromises between various factions within the governing elite.120 
Governing Iran has been described as a complicated “game” in which the rules are known 
only to a few key players and the Supreme Leader serves as referee.121 Many within the 
regime wield little formal power but exercise tremendous authority of decision-making 
processes by the future of their relationships and negotiating skill.  
As a charismatic figure with extensive religious qualifications who led the 
Revolution, Khomeini’s authority was rarely questioned or challenged. Khamenei, by 
contrast, entered office from a much weaker position. Unlike his predecessor, Khamenei 
has never been regarded as a charismatic figure. Khamenei’s religious credentials are less 
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impressive than Khomeini’s and those many of his contemporaries. To compensate for 
these shortcomings, Khamenei has relied on his relationship with the IRGC and elevated 
their status within the state.122 Over the last two decades, Khamenei has helped active 
and retired IRGC officers secure influential political positions and consolidate their 
control over the economy in order to maintain their loyalty and keep rival political 
leaders and groups at bay. It would be a mistake, however, to assume that the IRGC’s 
loyalty to the Khamenei stems solely from patronage. On the contrary, the IRGC appears 
to recognize that velayat-e faqih and the legitimacy of clerical rule are as vital to their 
own existence as they are to the Supreme Leader.  
a. IRGC’s Economic Privileges 
The IRGC’s economic might, for example, is not merely an example of 
thinly-veiled cronyism, but is in fact codified by the Iranian Constitution. Article 147 
stipulates that “the government must utilize the personnel and technical equipment of the 
army in relief operations as well as for educational and productive ends.” During 
Rafsanjani’s presidency, this was interpreted broadly to allow the Guards to consolidate 
control over the country’s major industries, including construction, hydrocarbons, and 
telecommunications.123 The IRGC presently exercises direct or indirect control over 
more than one hundred companies and accounts approximately 35 percent of Iran’s 
GDP.124 
b. IRGC’s Political Privileges 
The IRGC’s increased role in domestic politics has been even more 
dramatic. During the 1997 presidential election, several IRGC leaders, including IRGC 
Commander Mohsen Rezai openly campaign against Mohammad Khatami and the liberal 
reformers. Khatami’s pledges to liberalize the Iranian economy, expand democratization, 
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and improve diplomatic relations with the West were perceived as a threat to the spirit of 
the Revolution as interpreted by certain IRGC commanders. Rezai even threatened that 
the Guards would prevent liberals from entering the Majlis if elected.125 Although 
Khamenei initially attempted to position himself between the reformers and the 
hardliners and even dismissed Rezai at Khatami’s request, he too came to view the 
reformers as a threat, and relied on a variety of legal tools to weaken Khatami’s 
administration.126 At the same time, Khamenei permitted or encouraged the IRGC to 
adopt increasingly hard-line tactics against the reformers. For example, during student 
protests in 1999, 24 IRGC commanders publicly threatened to launch a coup if Khatami 
failed to restore order.127 
After Khatami’s election, Khamenei also began to appoint veteran IRGC 
officers to political posts throughout the government. While these began with direct 
appointments to various positions inside the Office of the Supreme Leader, they quickly 
expanded to the Majles. While virtually no IRGC members served in parliament during 
the 1980s and 1990s, approximately one-third of parliamentarians have been IRGC 
veterans since the mid-2000s.128 Likewise, cabinet ministries have been dominated by 
the IRGC in recent years.129 The most noteworthy example of this crossover into politics 
for former IRGC officers is of course the election of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in 
2005. The protests that erupted in the wake of his controversial 2009 reelection were put 
down by the IRGC with substantial assistance from the Basij.  
3. Impact of Privileges on Military Readiness 
The effect that the IRGC’s encroachment into economic and political realms has 
had on its combat effectiveness is debatable. Iran has not faced a sustained, conventional 
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military conflict with an external adversary since the Iran-Iraq War, so the results of 
Rafsanjani’s reform efforts remain inconclusive. Likewise the IRGC’s interoperability 
with the regular forces has not yet been tested, even though the services participate in 
regular combined exercises.130 Nevertheless, the IRGC’s evolution into a “network [or] 
brotherhood, in which personalities and connections mattered far more than structures,” 
means that assessing its ability to conduct conventional military operations is arguably 
the least less important part of understanding its role in contemporary Iran.131 
E. ZENITH OF THE ISLAMIST STATE? 
Although Iran has not experienced any significant threat of a military-led 
revolution or coup d’état since 1979, the IRGC’s dominance of electoral politics has 
become so pronounced that in some ways it resembles the military juntas of Latin 
America during the 1970s more than the transitioning democracy it appeared to be during 
the reformist Khatami era. Yet there is little evidence to suggest that the IRGC is 
interested in undermining the Supreme Leader’s authority as the Guards’ enthusiasm for 
upholding clerical rule. Rather than a silent military coup, the depth of the IRGC’s 
commitment to the mullah’s Islamist ideology may actually represent the zenith of the  
While it is too early to determine whether other Islamist states will follow Iran’s 
path to such militaristic and undemocratic extremes, the elements of the Iranian regime’s 
approach to CMR—the purges of senior officers, the expansion of both democratic and 
non-democratic control mechanisms, and the strengthening of an alternative coercive 
element—all have their echoes in the AKP-run Turkey and arguably Egypt under the 
Brotherhood. Whether Turkish and Egyptian Islamists continue in Iran’s footsteps may 
depend on their ability to impose an Islamist ideology on the military and secure the kind 
of endogenous control that the IRGC seems to demonstrate. 
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V. CMR IN TURKEY 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Political Islam is hardly a new phenomenon in Turkey; religion has been a critical 
part of state-building since the days of the Ottoman Empire. Even as Kemalism became 
the country’s secular religion after the founding of the modern Turkish Republic, Islamist 
ideas and political organizations never disappeared completely. Still, the AKP’s 
dominance of Turkish politics over the last decade represents something new. Not only is 
the AKP’s electoral success unprecedented in democratic Turkey, but the party has 
managed to reduce the political influence of the Turkish armed forces to arguably its 
lowest level since the nineteenth century. While many inside and outside of Turkey have 
celebrated the weakening of the military’s political influence as evidence of democratic 
consolidation, Turkish Islamists’ commitment to democratic reform has been uneven at 
best. Turkish Islamists have demonstrated an authoritarian streak and a tendency toward 
conspiratorial politics.  
Turkey’s Islamists are, of course, distinct from Iran’s in several ways. Whereas 
Ayatollah Khomeini insisted that the government be led by those in “cloaks and turbans,” 
Turkey’s Islamists prefer the suit and tie—a preference that reflects substance as much as 
style. Publicly, AKP members have consistently stressed their commitment to secularism 
and the party’s policy priorities have largely sidestepped issues of religiosity, a marked 
contrast with the fusion of politics and religion in Iran. There is little evidence to suggest 
that any prominent Islamist in Turkey envisions a state comparable to Iran’s theocratic 
form of government. However, from an organizational perspective, Turkey’s Islamists 
have demonstrated many of the same characteristics as Iran’s clerics. In both countries, 
Islamists have used democratic tools, such as constitutional reform and the court system, 
to increase institutional control over the military while simultaneously subverting 
democratic norms to suppress dissent. Moreover the political leadership in both countries 
has relied on trusted agents (i.e., those who have been educated or indoctrinated by 
Islamist thought) to fill key government and security roles.  
 62 
Indeed, the military-led “deep state” that dominated Turkish politics for decades 
appears to have been replaced not by effective democratic institutions and the rule of law 
but by a new, Islamist-oriented “deep state.” Yet there is also a growing rift within 
Turkey’s Islamist movement. Prime Minister Erdogan, who has been the face of the 
movement for the past decade, may be trying to distance himself from the influential 
Gülen movement, which may in fact form the backbone of the AKP and the Turkish 
government. How this rivalry plays out over the next few years will have major 
implications for the future of both Islamism and CMR in Turkey. 
B. CMR IN TURKEY BEFORE 2002 
1. Islam and the Emergence of a Military-Bureaucratic Elite in the Late 
Ottoman Empire and Early Turkish Republic  
The struggle between the military and AKP for control of the state over the last 
decade is in a very real sense the latest chapter in a competition that has been ongoing for 
five centuries. In the early sixteenth century, Ottoman rulers perceived the Islamic 
heterodoxy as a potentially severe threat as Islamic sects—many of which were led by 
charismatic leaders capable of undermining the authority of the Porte—seemed capable 
of fracturing the empire.132 To minimize this threat, Ottoman rulers co-opted religion by 
declaring the sultan the head of a new Ottoman Caliphate and bringing Islamic scholars 
into the business of state-building. This new religious elite, called ulema, would come to 
exercise vast control over the empire’s administrative, legal, and educational systems 
over the course of three centuries beginning in 1517.  
As the eighteenth century drew to a close and the Porte began to consider the 
expanding empires of Europe a growing threat, sultans Selim III and Mahmud II 
implemented a series of reforms that ultimately devastated the ulema. While the reforms 
were designed to increase revenue generation and military modernization, they elevated 
two new classes to power: bureaucrats educated in secular schools and a new military 
force trained and influenced by Western Europeans. The rise of these groups laid the 
                                                 
132 Serif Mardin, “Religion and Secularism in Turkey,” The Modern Middle East: A Reader ed. Albert 
Hourani, Philip S. Khoury, and Mary C. Wilson, Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1991, 348–
52. 
 63 
foundation for a top-down approach to modernization, centered on a military-
bureaucratic elite that would become a foundational principle of the Turkish Republic. 
They did not, however, displace the ulema overnight.133 On the contrary, the Ottoman 
Empire’s administration remained contentiously divided until its collapse. 
By the mid-nineteenth century the empire had entered into a period of irreversible 
decline, and two distinct and contradictory narratives about the root causes of the 
empire’s troubles emerged from the Ottomans’ bifurcated elite structure. According to 
the ulema, “the reason for the decline was religious: the Ottomans had neglected their 
duties as Muslims, and therefore they had lost the power they commanded when their 
faith had been strong.”134  For secular bureaucrats and military leaders, the problem was 
just the opposite: the inefficiencies, corruption, and ineptitude of the religious elite were 
slowly poisoning the organs of the state and precluding the emergence of a modern, 
European-style government.  
This religious-secular divide would dominate Ottoman political thought until the 
empire’s collapse and exert a major influence on Mustafa Kemal, who considered Islam 
an impediment to Turkish nationalism and state formation: 
Turks were a great nation even before they adopted Islam. This religion 
did not help the Arabs, Iranians, Egyptians and others to unite with Turks 
to form a nation. Conversely, it weakened the Turks’ national relations; it 
numbed Turkish national feelings and enthusiasm.135  
Ataturk’s vision of the Turkish state was based not on the principles of Islam, but instead 
on the “six arrows” of Kemalism, which were codified in Article 2 of the 1924 
Constitution.136 Ataturk considered the Turkish military Kemalism’s natural ally and its 
officer corps the “vanguard of a new Enlightenment”137 Not only had the military already 
been heavily influenced by secular values by virtue of its exposure to Western thought 
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and training, but the very structure of the force—namely the conscription, education, and 
indoctrination of young men from different parts of the country and with diverse 
backgrounds—could be used to help forge the new Turkish identity Ataturk considered 
vital to state formation.138 In this sense, the military was not only the protector of the new 
Turkish Republic, but a vehicle for expanding the reach and influence of Kemalism. 
Although Ataturk prohibited military officers from holding political office while in 
uniform, the government was dominated by military veterans for the first three decades of 
the Republic.139   Between 1923 and 1950, the political party founded by Ataturk, the 
CHP, enjoyed single-party rule in Turkey. The CHP was a “creature of the military 
establishment and its civilian allies”; its existence reflected a continuation of the top-
down approach to modernization typical of the Ottoman period.140 The transition to 
multiparty politics in 1946, however, unleashed new forces on the Turkish political 
machine: the middle classes, urban poor, the rural population, and religious 
conservatives. These groups comprised the base of the new Democratic Party (DP), 
whose leader Adnan Menderes became the country’s first democratically-elected prime 
minister in 1950.141 Menderes’ relationship with the military was rough from the start, 
and he responded to repeated coup rumors by purging the military of many top 
officers.142 His ten-year rule came to a disastrous end with the 1960 military coup, which 
preceded his execution a year later.143 While some have pointed to the authoritarian 
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scholars are generally dismissive of this argument and insist that the military relied on 
“trumped-up charges” to justify an intervention that was about little more than protecting 
the armed forces’ interests.144  
2. Military Dominance of the State: 1960–2002 
The 1960 coup was a watershed in modern Turkish history as it reaffirmed the 
military’s dominant position within the state and established a pattern for future 
interventions. The quick restoration of democratic civilian rule less than eighteen months 
after the removal of Menderes helped normalize the coup, enabling to military to credibly 
claim that it sought not to maximize its own interests but instead to preserve the secular 
Kemalist system. The Turkish armed forces thus redefined professionalism, inverting the 
civilian and military roles as typically understood by proponents of democratic CMR. By 
the Turkish model, “professionalism is not perceived as antithetical to its continued 
significance in domestic politics,” but refers instead to “an esprit de corps among soldiers 
and officers, the acquisition of sophisticated weaponry, effective fighting capability, and 
continued interference in civilian political affairs.”145 This sensibility was reinforced 
both institutionally and culturally, elevating military influence beyond the previous 
heights reached under Ataturk. 
The institutionalization of military dominance began with the 1960 constitution 
and the Turkish Armed Forces Internal Directive. The latter made explicit what the 
military had previously assumed implicitly, namely that its primary duty was to “protect 
the Turkish homeland and the Republic, by arms when necessary, against internal and 
external threats” and to protect and preserve the Turkish homeland and the Turkish 
Republic as defined in the constitution.”146 This principle became manifest with the 
constitutionally-mandated National Security Council (MGK). While formally an advisory 
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body to the prime minister on issues of defense and national security, in actuality the 
MGK became the mechanism by which senior military leaders voiced their concerns and 
priorities to civilian leaders and served as the real locus of power in Turkey from 1961 
until 2002. The 1983 Law on the MGK formally expanded the body’s purview by 
redefining “national security” to include “protection of the constitutional order of the 
state, its national existence, integrity and all political, social, cultural, and economic 
interests of the state in the international field.”147 Although the MGK was and remains 
headed by the Turkish president—which ostensibly places the body under civilian 
control—in actuality, the president has been selected by the military. Between 1923 and 
1989 every president but one, the DP’s Celal Bayar from 1950–1960, had been selected 
among a group of retired generals and the three presidents appointed between 1989 and 
2007 were staunch Kemalists who did little to rein in the military. The MGK enabled the 
military to preserve and expand its autonomy. Issues like pay, promotions, and 
procurement, for example, were handled by the generals with little-to-no civilian 
oversight. Likewise, the military’s management of its own expansive court system and 
schools for educating officers enabled the armed forces to operate inside an autonomous 
bubble removed from the rest of society.148 In the economic realm, the Mutual 
Assistance Agency of the Army (OYAK) has ballooned from a pension fund into one of 
the country’s largest business conglomerates—one afforded considerable government 
benefits.149 
The military’s institutional prerogatives were strengthened by its cultural 
influence. The armed forces have long been the most highly regarded institution in the 
state—a reflection of a highly successful myth-making campaign. The military’s 
influence over the media and education system has played a key role in promoting a 
popular view of the military as the state’s supreme institution. To this end, the military 
has often inflated the threat posed by foreign powers and organizations, including the 
Soviet Union, Iran’s Islamic Republic, Iraq, and the PKK, to help justify its prerogatives. 
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Likewise, the military has also emphasized the moral superiority of its members, 
suggesting that those who serve are in a sense the most Turkish members of society. The 
phrase “every Turk is born a soldier” is a common one, taught in both military and non-
military schools and repeated in political discourse.150 
While the military has long been the dominant force in Turkish politics, it has 
never enjoyed a total monopoly on power or social influence. Autonomous and semi-
autonomous actors have always been present within politics, the economy, and civil 
society. Indeed, the military has long relied on non-military allies among the political 
elite to preserve its lofty station. This dependency slowly developed into a vulnerability 
with each political intervention. Although the military’s public approval rating never 
cratered, each coup alienated a key political ally. In 1960 it was the peasant classes that 
had supported Menderes and the DP; in 1970, left-wing revolutionary groups; in 1980, 
right-wing ultranationalists; and in 1997 the intelligentsia and Islamists. By 2002, the 
military had become politically isolated and its only devoted supporters were ultra-
secularists whose national popularity had been waning for decades.151 
The military’s association with “deep state” controversies also contributed to its 
decline. The origins, members, and aims of Turkey’s “deep state” remain controversial 
and shrouded in mystery, but they are generally traceable to the “stay-behind forces” 
allegedly organized by the CIA and British Secret Intelligence Service during the 1950s 
to repel a Soviet invasion.152 While organized initially as a resistance force trained to 
perform “espionage, sabotage, and assassination missions,” Turkey’s “deep state” grew 
into a large underground network connecting military officers, the National Intelligence 
Organization (MIT), the TNP, right-wing ultranationalist groups and politicians, 
journalists, and organized crime. Among other crimes, the “deep state” has been accused 
of stoking domestic unrest—particularly the extreme political violence of the 1970s—in 
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order to justify military intervention into state politics and other authoritarian practices. 
Public awareness and outrage over the “deep state” peaked in the 1990s when “extra-
judicial killings, massacres, and village evacuations became commonplace,” particularly 
as the state widened its conflict with the PKK.153 Perhaps more significantly, a fatal car 
accident in 1996 involving the deputy commander of the TNP, the former leader of the 
ultranationalist Grey Wolves criminal organization (who was on Interpol’s most wanted 
list), and a prominent Kurdish parliamentarian and his wife became a national scandal 
that all but proved the existence of such an organization.  
As public confidence in state institutions dropped, new power structures emerged. 
Some of these came from the economic sphere as new businesses and business 
associations began to flourish as a result of the economic liberalization schemes launched 
under Turgut Ozal during the 1980s and 1990s. Another emerged from civil society 
groups where an interest in modernizing Islamic values and ideas first took root. 
Beginning in the 1970s, conservative Islamic intellectuals began developing a new 
ideology that fused Islam with Turkish nationalism as a counter to radical leftist 
ideologies. Their ideas were couched in the language of revivalism: they sought to restore 
Islam to the forefront of Turkish politics and society as it had been during the days of the 
Ottoman Caliphate.154 Ironically, the MGK played a major role in the spread of this new, 
neo-Ottoman ideology. The ban on leftist groups following the 1980 coup left a “political 
vacuum that was gradually filled by religious discourse.”155 The ideas spread through 
intellectual circles, schools, and civil society organizations; its adherents included 
businessmen, center-right politicians, and, at least initially, some senior military officers. 
One of the leading voices from this group was Necmettin Erbakan, who headed multiple 
Islamist parties between the 1970s and 1990s, including the Welfare Party—the 
forerunner to the AKP. Although the military banned multiple incarnations of their 
political parties (including Erbakan’s Welfare Party after the 1997 coup), Islamist ideas 
had already begun to demonstrate a higher degree of flexibility, durability, and 
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pragmatism than had other ideologies promoted as alternatives to Kemalism throughout 
the latter decades of the twentieth century. In this light, the military’s distrust of Islamism 
was not without merit. As the first decade of AKP rule in Turkey has demonstrated, 
Islamism has become the most serious challenge to the military-bureaucratic order in 
more than a century.  
C. CMR IN TURKEY SINCE 2002 
Since the AKP came to power in the 2002, two major power struggles have 
played out concurrently in Turkey: a civil-military competition for control of the state 
and a competition for control of the Islamist movement. While the civil-military struggle 
has yielded extraordinary gains for the civilian government and garnered much press 
attention over the last several years, the latter may prove more consequential for the long-
term future of Turkish democracy. Paradoxically, the intra-Islamist struggle may 
ultimately also have a greater impact on the long-term future of CMR in Turkey. 
Depending on how this struggle plays out, intra-Islamist tensions could provide an 
opening for the military to reassert itself politically, or conversely, pave the way for 
deeper reforms that reduce the strength and prestige of the military in a manner similar to 
Iran’s conventional forces.  
1. Islamists and Generals 
During the early to mid-2000s, the most potent weapon the AKP had in its arsenal 
against the military was the EU. Although the EU accession process was initiated long 
before the AKP came to power, the AKP promoted reform with unprecedented zeal as it 
legitimized the AKP’s effort to weaken the military’s grip on the state by coupling it with 
a politically popular objective that secularists could embrace. The EU had been openly 
critical of military influence over Turkish politics for years, citing undue control over the 
bureaucracy, judiciary, media, and executive branch in a series of progress reports issued 
in the late 1990s and early 2000s.156 The reports provided specific recommendations for 
increasing democratic control over the military, including revisions to the MGK and the 
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Armed Forces Internal Service Law. Many of these recommendations have already been 
implemented through legislation and executive decree: the Turkish parliament approved 
reform packages in 2003 and 2004 that inserted a secretary general at head of the MGK, 
helped transform the council into a “genuinely advisory body,” and reduced the 
jurisdiction of military courts.157 The military itself was initially supportive of reform, as 
“most within the military accepted the identification of Europe with modernization.”158 
However, as Erdogan began to make it clear that his government was interested in reform 
even without membership assurances from the EU, the military grew skeptical of the 
reform process and wary of the AKP.159  
This skepticism was exacerbated by the AKP’s willingness to challenge the 
military’s leadership role in fields that were not necessarily identified by the EU as areas 
for reform. Prior to 2007, these efforts were somewhat restrained and halting. As Gareth 
Jenkins writes, the AKP engaged “in a shadow play of symbols and oblique rhetoric in 
which the [party] would subtly probe the boundaries of Kemalist orthodoxy only to 
withdraw again if it provoked a reaction from the military.”160 For example, in 2003 the 
AKP introduced a plan to reform the country’s education system partly through the 
expansion of Islamic imam-hatip schools, setting off a power struggle with the military. 
The military, which had historically exerted tremendous influence over the education 
system and its curriculum, argued that education was a national security priority and 
therefore within its purview. Undeterred by the military’s public pressure, the AKP-led 
parliament passed the legislation; however, when President Ahmet Necdet Sezer 
threatened to veto, the AKP backed down. Nevertheless, the episode signaled the AKP’s 
confidence and willingness to test the limits of the military’s jurisdiction in the non-
security realm—an opening salvo in the battle for cultural influence.161  
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The Islamist-military competition became far more intense and sensational in 
2007, beginning with the AKP’s announcement that Foreign Minister Abdullah Gul 
would be the party’s candidate for president. Although the Turkish presidency is a largely 
ceremonial post, the military had for decades grown accustomed to selecting the 
president and balked at the prospect of an Islamist filling the role. In response, the 
General Staff posted a thinly veiled threat to the AKP on its website in an incident that 
has come to be described as an “e-coup.” The General Staff’s response was condemned 
by Western diplomats, as both the EU and United States urged the military to show 
restraint and respect the democratic process.162 Undeterred by the military’s threat, the 
AKP called for early elections which it won handily, paving the way for the Gul’s 
confirmation.  
2007 also marked the beginning of the state’s controversial investigation into the 
“deep state” known as Ergenekon. The roots of the investigation stretch back to the 
murder of a secular judge who had ruled against a schoolteacher who had been denied a 
promotion because of her insistence on wearing a traditional Islamic headscarf. While the 
murderer was initially accused of being a supporter of the AKP who had been inspired by 
Islamist criticism of the court’s decision, Turkish police allegedly discovered evidence 
connecting the murderer to a secretive ultranationalist organization.163 The police alleged 
that the group had elaborate plans to conduct assassinations nationwide in order to 
provoke public unrest and open the door to an overthrow of the AKP-led government. In 
the nearly six years since the investigation began, police have arrested more than three 
hundred individuals from the military, intelligence services, media, and academia. 
International opinion on the case has transformed from cautiously supportive to 
disdainful as the claims made by the prosecutor have become increasingly paranoid. Such 
claims include the allegation that Turkey’s MIT is under “complete control” of the CIA 
and that the mafia is run by the Pentagon.164 In Turkey, however, opinion on the case 
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seems to remain fairly divided. While the trial has plenty of domestic critics, it has also 
retained a fair share of supporters. This is due in part to the Susurluk incident and long-
standing fears of shadow state, but also because of the changes in the media landscape. 
Because secularists no longer enjoy a monopoly on Turkish media, the Ergenekon case 
has become a “litmus test for the press,” dividing media outlets into two camps: those 
who support the AKP and the Islamists on one side and those who support the military 
and secularists on the other.165  
Ergenekon is just one of several investigations into the activities of purportedly 
mutinous military officers. The most publicized of these has been the so-called 
“Sledgehammer” investigation, named after a 2003 war game at First Army headquarters 
in Istanbul. At the trial’s conclusion in September 2012, 330 officers were convicted and 
sentenced for up to twenty years in prison, including several flag officers. Like 
Ergenekon, observers have raised serious doubts about the evidence in the trial, 
suggesting that the prosecution has been based more on political concerns than actual 
wrongdoing.166  
In addition to these convictions, premature retirements—voluntary and 
otherwise—have left the military bereft of senior commanders. In July 2011, the 
military’s chief of staff and service chiefs all resigned in protest over a disagreement with 
Erdogan over staff promotions. A similar incident occurred in January 2013, when Fleet 
Commander Admiral Nurset Guner, who was widely reported to be the leading candidate 
to become Navy chief in August, suddenly announced his retirement. In total, the 
government has placed more than half of all Navy admirals and one in ten generals in jail 
since 2007—a situation that is almost certainly having a negative effect on military 
readiness.167 
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2. Battle for Control of Turkey’s Islamist Movement 
Islamism in Turkish politics is a far more decentralized phenomenon than in Iran 
or Egypt. Whereas Iran’s Islamic Republic was dominated by the cult of Khomeinism 
and Egypt’s ruling Freedom and Justice Party is little more than the political arm of the 
Muslim Brotherhood, the AKP has no singular Islamist organization, philosophy, or 
ideology behind it. In this sense Erdogan’s insistence that the AKP is a “conservative 
Muslim” party rather than an Islamist one is more than just shrewd politics—it reflects 
the idea that the party remains untethered by the trappings of an Islamist organization. 
The idea of a truly independent AKP has come under intense scrutiny in recent years by 
the increasingly public conflict between Erdogan and Turkey’s most influential cleric, 
Fethullah Gülen.  
Of the Islamic scholars who began promoting Turkey’s Islamic revivalism in the 
1970s, Gülen is undeniably the most prominent. Today he heads a global movement with 
millions of followers in more than one hundred countries. His adherents—who prefer the 
term “followers” to “members”—liken the group to a “civic society” organization and 
emphasize the voluntary nature of their connections within the network. The movement’s 
website emphasizes secular values such as “sympathy for the fellow human, compassion, 
and altruism.”168 Publicly, the group maintains that education remains its primary 
mission, as it has been since the organization’s inception. Gülenists operate more than 
one thousand schools worldwide including several dozen charter schools in the United 
States, where students of all grade levels receive a secular education with a heavy 
emphasis on math and science.169  
Gülen has declared support for democracy, scientific education, tolerance toward 
non-Muslims, and is adamantly opposed to violence. Unlike Khomeini, Gülen publicly 
opposes the imposition of Shari’a and has criticized the governments of Iran and Saudi 
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Arabia for imposing Islamic law on the state.170 Gülen even broke with popular opinion 
in Turkey by condemned the Gaza flotilla runners aboard the Mavi Marmara after the 
Israeli forces stormed the vessel and killed nine Turkish activists.171  
In spite of all of this, Gülen and his movement remain the source of tremendous 
intrigue and controversy. The conservative U.S. think-tank Middle East Forum, for 
example, argues that Gülen’s “rhetoric of tolerance is only skin-deep” and that the 
movement’s true aim is “to govern every aspect of life in [Turkey].”172 Others have 
suggested that the Gülen movement is the new “deep state,” and that it aims to become—
if it has not yet already—a shadow government controlling democratically-elected 
civilian leaders as puppets.173 While such claims are almost certainly exaggerated and 
might be rightly derided as “Islamophobic,” the notion that the group’s power may have 
serious implications for the future of Turkish democracy should not be considered a 
controversial claim.174  
Although he has lived in the United States since 1999, Gülen’s network continues 
to exert enormous influence in Turkish politics and society today. In addition to the 
network of schools and universities, his followers control the country’s biggest Islamic 
bank, a major business conglomerate called the Kaynak Holding Group, and one of the 
country’s largest media consortiums.  
Such a diverse portfolio might be dismissed as little more than a negative 
consequence of excessive liberalization if it were not for the inroads the group has 
allegedly made into the government.175 According to multiple sources, Gülenist 
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penetration of the state is most pronounced inside the TNP, where some estimate that the 
organization’s members constitute up to 80 percent of the force.176 U.S. diplomats have 
raised concerns about Gülenists’ alleged infiltration of the TNP as well as reports that the 
police have increasingly been used to intimidate critics of the AKP and the Gülen 
movement.177 The government may also be interested in expanding the TNP’s 
capabilities as Ankara recently agreed to purchase 15 advanced Bell helicopters from the 
United States for $75 million.178 
Two individuals who have attempted to shed light on the relationship between the 
group and the TNP, journalist Ahmet Sik and former TNP commander Hanefi Avci, have 
been arrested and put in jail. Sik, who was arrested just prior to the release of a book on 
the Gülenist takeover of the TNP called The Imam’s Army, was charged as a member of 
Ergenekon. Turkish observers have called this charge “absurd,” as Sik had for years been 
an outspoken critic of the military and a proponent of democratic reform.179 In addition 
to Sik and Avci, the police have actively pursued other critics of the Gülen movement 
and the AKP, particularly journalists in the non-Islamist media who also happen to be 
business rivals of Gülen allies. Indeed, secularists and liberals in the media seem to have 
supplanted the military as the Gülenists’ primary target. In 2012, Turkey imprisoned 
76 journalists—more than any other country in the world. The Committee to Protect 
Journalists has released a number of scaling reports on Turkey’s media crisis, accusing 
the government of waging “one of the world’s biggest crackdowns on press freedom in 
recent history.”180 Gülenist-owned media outlets, however, have not only been spared 
from this crackdown, but have attempted to cast doubt on those who criticize the 
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movement. For example, a February 2012 article in the Gülenist-owned Today’s Zaman 
defends the police against “Kemalists and liberal intellectuals” who have raised questions 
about the motives and activity of the police force, accusing them of “hav[ing] no insight 
into how the police think.”181  
The relationship between the Gülen movement and the AKP remains an open 
question. Erdogan himself is not a follower, but President Gul is. The group is widely 
suspected of having followers in key leadership posts within the interior and education 
ministries, the MIT, and the judiciary, but precisely who is a member and who is not 
remains largely a matter of speculation.182 What is clear is that Gülenists and non-
Gülenists within the AKP shared a tactical alliance that allowed them to put aside any 
differences in order to weaken the military. Within the last two years, however, this 
alliance has begun to show signs of strain. Erdogan has actively sought to strengthen his 
own power base at the expense of the Gülenists. For example, a March 2012 education 
reform plan—an update of the failed 2003 initiative—paved the way for a dramatic 
expansion of religious imam-hatip schools in Turkey. The measure was “conspicuously 
aimed” at the Gülenists, whose schools provide in secular education.183 Around the same 
time, a Gülenist prosecutor in Istanbul subpoenaed MIT chief and Erdogan ally Sadrettin 
Sarikaya on suspicion of collaborating with the PKK—a move widely seen as a political 
move to challenge Erdogan’s authority.  
The competition between Erdogan and Gülen for control of the AKP and 
Turkey’s Islamist movement is likely to culminate over a fight for reform of the country’s 
political system. Erdogan, who is currently serving his third and final term as prime 
minister, is attempting to transform the Turkish government from a parliamentary to a 
presidential system in order to run for president and expand his political power. Gul, who 
is widely expected to succeed Erdogan as prime minister, seeks to preserve the system as 
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is. Although the two men remain the most popular leaders in the Turkish government, the 
conflict threatens to permanently divide the AKP, with Gul and the Gülenists on one side, 
and Erdogan and his loyalists on the other. Public support for Erdogan’s presidential plan 
is low; as of November 2012, those preferring the parliamentary system outnumbered 
Erdogan’s supporters by a margin of two-to-one.184 Even if no such transition plan goes 
through, Erdogan is unlikely to go quietly into the night and may try to expand the power 
of the presidency through informal and extra-legal means.185  
D. APPROACHING AN INFLECTION POINT? 
Unlike the Shah’s deeply unpopular military, the Turkish military was and 
remains one of Turkey’s most popular and trusted institutions, which has had a profound 
impact on the Islamists’ approach to reforming CMR. Although the military currently 
appears to have been thoroughly and permanently weakened by an institutional reform 
process that has been largely democratic and a series of purges that have been anything 
but, the future of CMR in Turkey remains largely uncertain. The fate of CMR in Turkey 
almost certainly depends on the trajectory of Islamism. If the Gülen movement becomes 
the strongest force in Islamist politics, it might seek to weaken the military even further 
and possibly elevate the TNP as the regime’s primary protection force. While it was not 
uncommon to see Erdogan compared to the ill-fated Prime Minister Menderes during the 
height of civil-military tensions just a few short years ago, an ascendant Gülen movement 
could actually steer Erdogan toward a fate not unlike that of Iran’s Bani Sadr—an 
Islamist ally cast off when his star burned too bright.  
Yet such a scenario is anything but assured. Ironically, Erdogan may find that his 
best option for re-asserting his authority is to try to reconcile with the military. Halil 
Karaveli argues that Erdogan has a good working relationship with the current chief of 
the Turkish General Staff and that Erdogan and his allies may have actually been 
disappointed with the recent Sledgehammer verdict.186 It is not inconceivable that 
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Erdogan might try to make common cause with the military against the Gülenists, whose 
dominance of the police force and judiciary has enabled the most controversial efforts 
against the military. Such a scenario might not be wholly dissimilar to the later years of 
Nasser’s Egypt or even Saddam Hussein’s Iraq, whereby ideological decay gives way to 
a resurgent form of sultanism. Of course, if Erdogan has such an appetite for personal 
rulership, he might encounter far more resistance than either Nasser or Hussein ever did. 
Abdullah Gul’s ascendance and popularity, the Gülenists’ presence (if not dominance) 
within the AKP, the maturity of Turkish democratic institutions, and popular opposition 
to Erdogan’s plans for a presidential system suggest he would have a tough road to hoe. 
Even if he were able to marshal overwhelming military support, the Gülenists’ influence 
in the police force, judiciary, media, and business would present a major obstacle to 
Erdogan’s ambitions.   
Whatever the future of CMR in Turkey, the last decade suggests that even 
moderate Islamists who express strong support for democracy are willing to subvert 
democratic norms in order to maximize their power, particularly with respect to the 
military. Wherever the real locus of power within the AKP lies, the government’s 
willingness to imprison journalists and sully the reputation of its judicial system has 
parallels to the Iranian Revolution. Even if this first decade of AKP rule proves to be the 
low-water mark for Turkish democracy in the post-military state era, it is a troublesome 
sign that bears a stronger resemblance to highly ideological movements in non-
democracies than to the traditional democratic consolidation path.  
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VI. CMR IN EGYPT 
Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood is not only the Middle East’s oldest Islamist 
organization but almost certainly its most disciplined. Yet of the three Islamist-dominated 
governments examined in this thesis, the Brotherhood’s control of the state in general and 
the military in particular is by far the weakest. This is partly a function of time: both the 
mullahs in Iran and the AKP in Turkey required years to consolidate their authority over 
the military—a process that remains very much ongoing in the latter—so it should not be 
surprising that civilian control of the Egyptian armed forces remains tenuous today, less 
than one year into Morsi’s first presidential term. The toxic political environment that 
Mubarak left behind has also proven a major hurdle for the Brothers. The grievances that 
brought young Egyptians to the streets in early 2011, particularly the economic ones, 
continue to drive domestic unrest and threaten regime stability. A shared anxiety over 
further domestic unrest appears to have pushed the Brothers and the military into a 
tactical alliance. For the moment, neither side appears interested in challenging the 
authority of the other for fear of a total government collapse that would serve no one’s 
interests.  
While there is tremendous uncertainty surrounding both the Brotherhood’s 
intentions and the future of the Egyptian state, what is clear is that the Brothers have thus 
far prioritized maximizing their own political power over democratic reform. In this 
regard, the Brothers’ approach to governance bears a strong resemblance not only to 
Mubarak but to that of their Islamist forebears in Iran and Turkey.  
A. WHAT THE BROTHERS INHERITED: INSTITUTIONAL LEGACIES 
OF THE PRE-ARAB SPRING ERA 
Egyptian authoritarianism is so deeply intertwined with the country’s CMR that it 
is nearly impossible to distinguish one from the other. For more than half a century, the 
Egyptian presidency and its military have been by far the country’s most powerful 
institutions. Indeed, the weakness of other political actors in Egypt can be largely 
understood as a direct consequence of the country’s troubled civil-military relationship 
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and the oscillations between collaboration and competition. The military’s privileged 
position in Egyptian society and government can be traced back to the formation of the 
modern state under Nasser following the 1952 coup. Unlike Mustafa Kemal in Turkey, 
Nasser did not come to power with a clear vision of the state informed by ideology. 
Rather, Nasser and his Free Officers movement were motivated more by immediate goals 
such as anti-colonialism and the abolition of feudalism. While these were no doubt 
radical ideas requiring a dramatic re-ordering of Egyptian society, the Free Officers were 
“pragmatic nationalists and ‘diligent military bureaucrats’ with no predetermined views 
on political organization of ideological organization.”187 Although the Free Officers 
spoke of democratic reform, in practice they actively sought to undermine political 
pluralism, banning political parties purging potential political rivals such as the landed 
elite and the Muslim Brotherhood from the organs of the state. While Nasser did 
reconstitute the Egyptian assembly, the new parliament was “little more than a 
consultative body that rubber-stamped legislation originating with the president.”188 
Instead of a competitive democracy, the Free Officers laid the foundations for a single-
party system dominated by military officers. In Nasser’s own words, he “want[ed] no 
politics in the Army…but the Army as a whole to be a force in national politics.”189 
Despite this early pronouncement, the Egyptian state did not evolve as a military-
dominated state comparable to that of Kemalist Turkey. Instead, divisions within the 
military-bureaucratic elite left Nasser suspicious of the military and eager for an 
alternative source of political strength.  
An intra-military fissure first emerged with the removal of Egypt’s first president, 
Muhammad Naguib. Nasser, who led the Free Officers movement and as Interior 
Minister controlled the country’s intelligence and security services, was the more 
influential figure behind the scenes; however, Naguib, a senior military veteran himself, 
enjoyed significant public support. Naguib’s conciliatory stance towards non-military 
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elites—including the Muslim Brotherhood—and eagerness to empower the country’s 
parliament made him a formidable adversary and won him the support within the 
military. Two failed mutinies against Nasser and his Revolutionary Command Council 
(RCC) revealed the extent of the military’s factionalization. Mounting tensions between 
Naguib’s and Nasser’s factions culminated with Naguib’s resignation and subsequent 
house arrest in November 1954—less than eighteen months after he first assumed 
power.190  
The military’s unwillingness to stand united behind Nasser in his standoff against 
Naguib permanently altered the former’s perception of the military. As president, 
Nasser’s suspicion of the armed forces only hardened, particularly as his rivalry with Abd 
al-Hakim Amer intensified during the 1960s. As Defense Minister, Amer managed to 
secure the loyalty of many of the military’s top leaders, undermining Nasser’s authority 
over the force. Indeed, there is some speculation that the 1967 war with Israel may in fact 
have been an attempt by Amer to distinguish himself as Egypt’s most successful leader 
and assume control of the country. However, Egypt’s defeat in the war and Amer’s 
subsequent “suicide” led to an additional round of purges of commanders in order to 
bring the military back under Nasser’s command.  
More importantly, Nasser’s rivalries with Naguib and Amer accelerated the 
evolution of the security state. This “pyramid of intelligence and security services” 
included the General Intelligence Service (GIS), General Intelligence Directorate (GID), 
and later the Central Security Forces (CSF).191 The size and scope of the Interior 
Ministry’s internal security functions remains a feature of the Egyptian state today and is 
arguably Nasser’s most enduring legacy. Under Nasser, the Interior Ministry became the 
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to some. The securitization of the Egyptian state was so thorough that even Nasser’s 
political party, the Arab Socialist Union (ASU), was used more as a domestic spy service 
than a traditional political party.192 
Nasser’s successors continued to show a preference for the domestic security 
apparatus and a suspicion of the military. Upon assuming the presidency in 1970, Anwar 
Sadat set about removing his political rivals in the military and from within the 
presidency just as Nasser had in the 1950s. As part of his “revolution of rectification,” 
Sadat promised to liberalize Egyptian politics as well as its economy, but he ultimately 
came to view the polity as a threat, particularly after the 1977 bread riots. The riots, 
which were put down by the Egyptian army, reaffirmed the military’s role as “the 
ultimate guarantor of the regime’s survival” and enabled its leaders to establish 
themselves as “the core of the ruling elite.”193 Although Sadat appointed far more 
civilians to leadership positions within his government than Nasser had, the military was 
never fully marginalized. Even after preparation for war with Israel—the military’s 
raison d’etre—was made virtually irrelevant by the Camp David peace settlement in 
1979, the military’s dominance of the political environment rendered Sadat unable and 
unwilling to contract the force. 
The real maturation of Egypt’s security and intelligence services, however, 
occurred under Mubarak. The emergency law put into place after Sadat’s assassination 
was only a start; the Interior Ministry was given carte blanche with respect to suppressing 
political organizations. The services were allowed to conduct investigations, interrogate 
and detain political activists, disrupt public demonstrations, and infiltrate civil society 
organizations. The proximity of the security and intelligence services to the opposition 
ultimately made them the authority on public opinion, elevating their status within the 
shadow state. This is why General Intelligence Service chief Omar Suleiman became 
Mubarak’s most trusted adviser, and for a brief moment last January, his first vice 
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president. The close relationship between the president and the Interior Ministry soured 
Mubarak’s relationship with the military. This resentment helps explain why the military 
was so quick to abandon Mubarak and its decision to place Suleiman under arrest after 
the regime collapsed.    
Between 1967 and 2011 the military’s interventions into domestic politics were 
mostly held in check with one spectacular exception: the assassination of Sadat. Although 
most observers have highlighted the Islamist leanings of Sadat’s assassins, Springborg 
and Kandil have both drawn attention to the assassins’ military connections. All four 
were military officers and at least one—Abbud al-Zumur—has publicly acknowledged 
that frustration with Sadat’s peace treaty with Israel was the primary motivation behind 
the killing and that there was in fact a discussion of a military takeover of the 
government.194 While military dissatisfaction with Sadat was certainly high at this time, 
there is nothing to suggest that the majority of the officer corps supported his 
assassination or that there was any broader military conspiracy to remove him from 
power. That the military was either unable or unwilling to seize power directly in the 
aftermath of the Camp David peace accord and Sadat’s death is indicative of two 
important trends in Egyptian CMR: the officer corps’ distaste for such overt intervention 
into domestic politics after Amer’s death, and the ability of the Interior Ministry to 
maintain order and security on behalf of the presidency.  
The general lack of political activity on the part of the military during this time 
should not imply that Egypt was approaching anything close to normalized, democratic 
CMR prior to 2011. While fewer active duty officers were appointed to high-profile 
cabinet positions under Sadat and Mubarak than had been the case under Nasser, 
effective civilian control of the military was never close to fully realized. One important 
example of the military’s continued clout is the size of the force, which has remained 
roughly the same for decades despite the peace agreement with Israel. Even as high-level 
government posts went to civilian technocrats, senior and retired officers received 
appointments to “leading posts in government ministries, agencies, and state-owned 
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companies.”195 The military made major inroads into several of the Egyptian economy’s 
most lucrative sectors, including tourism, construction, consumer goods, and public 
utilities.196 The “military economy” accounts for one third or more of the entire Egyptian 
economy and the bureaucracy and local governments are full of retired officers eager to 
take care of their own.197  
Despite the enormity of such benefits, the military’s declaration of support for the 
Tahrir Square protesters and willingness to allow the Mubarak regime to collapse reveals 
that they were insufficient to secure total loyalty from the force. Low wages and poor 
living standards did little to increase loyalty among lower ranking officers and enlisted 
personnel. For more senior officers, the primary grievance with Mubarak was likely over 
the Interior Ministry’s ever-expanding portfolio—and funding. As of January 2011, the 
security service had ballooned to 1.4 million personnel and the Interior Ministry’s budget 
was growing at a rate three times that of the armed forces.198 
For six decades, the competition for political power in Egypt was restricted 
almost exclusively to these three actors—the presidency, the military, and the security 
apparatus. The Brotherhood’s successful bid for the presidency represents the most 
radical change to CMR since at least 1979. For now, the Brothers are caught in a difficult 
balancing act as the military tries to preserve its privileges, Interior Ministry forces 
continue to employ harsh tactics to quell unrest, and liberals at home and abroad call for 
democratic reform. How the Brothers manage these conflicting pressures may well 
determine the country’s fate for years to come.   
B. GUIDING PRINCIPLES AND ORGANIZATIONAL STRENGTHS OF 
THE BROTHERHOOD 
In order to make sense of how the Brothers have handled political to date and 
anticipate how they might continue to govern in the future, it is necessary to understand 
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what the Brotherhood is and how it has evolved since its founding as an apolitical aid 
organization in the 1920s.199 Despite the group’s earlier embrace of terrorism and 
radicalism, including a flirtation with fascism during the 1930s, the Brothers have in 
recent decades settled into a moderate, pragmatic style of politics. This has been done 
partly out of necessity. Under Nasser, Sadat, and Mubarak, the Brothers seemed to be in a 
constant and “cyclical pattern that usually began with an accommodation or an alliance, 
and ended with confrontation.”200 This pattern of interaction taught the Brotherhood two 
valuable lessons: how to effectively temper its politics without alienating core members 
and how to operate underground. With respect to the former, the Brothers strove to 
broaden their support base and avoid antagonizing the regime unnecessarily by 
renouncing violence, declaring support for democracy, rejecting theocratic governance, 
embracing neo-liberal economic ideas, and expressing support for human rights and civil 
liberties.201 As for the latter, the Brotherhood has always been a grassroots social 
movement first and foremost and a political entity second. Its greatest strength is its 
ability to recruit, indoctrinate, and retain members even during moments of intense 
domestic repression.  
It is the nature of the Brothers’ organizational strength that tends to arouse 
suspicion from outside observers, and not without good reason. The deep ideological 
commitment of the Brothers and the secrecy surrounding the group’s decision-making 
processes and organizational structure may have been vital to its survival as an 
underground organization, but these features do not lend themselves to open and 
transparent democratic procedures, particularly in a state struggling to transition out of its 
authoritarian past. All of this suggests a certain duality about the Brotherhood. On the one 
hand, the group has proven flexible and politically pragmatic—a far cry from the radical 
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jihadist network committed to transforming Egypt into an Islamic Republic similar to 
Iran and overthrowing moderate Islamist governments in the region as they are 
sometimes depicted by Western observers.202 On the other, the Brotherhood’s insularity 
provokes valid questions about its political goals—questions that have only intensified 
during Morsi’s first year as president.   
1. Recruitment Process and Organizational Structure 
Precise figures on the Brotherhood’s membership numbers are difficult to 
ascertain; however, most observers inside and outside the organization estimate that there 
are approximately half a million active members in Egypt.203 Part of the difficulty in 
determining an exact number is that becoming a Brother is not simply a voluntary 
commitment, but is instead a process that can take years to complete. Eric Trager recently 
published an article detailing how the Brothers identify, screen, and indoctrinate 
recruits—a process that can begin for children as young as nine years old and take up to 
eight years to complete.204 According to Trager, candidates for entry are “indoctrinated 
in the Brotherhood’s curriculum” and monitored closely monitored by senior Brothers to 
ensure loyalty, piety, and ideological commitment. Trager explains that while the roots of 
this process stretch back to the group’s founding under Hassan al-Banna in the 1920s, it 
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was formalized in the late 1970s in order to prevent infiltration by Interior Ministry 
elements under Sadat’s direction. What is particularly noteworthy about this process is 
the Brotherhood’s preference for identifying members on its own. Rather than relying on 
pious individuals to seek out the Brothers, the Brotherhood actively pursues individuals 
that it perceives as pious and likely to support its vision.  
While the Brotherhood’s recruitment process undoubtedly aims at producing a 
certain ideological cohesion, the group is not monolithic. Differing views within the 
organization on a variety of subjects have been reported for years, suggesting at least 
partial tolerance for dissenting opinions. While some have argued that “government 
repression [was] the glue holding the Brotherhood together” and that in the absence of 
such outside pressure internal disagreements could break the Brotherhood apart into 
competing factions, others—including Trager—maintain that such predictions are 
overblown and fail to account for the broader ideological commitment that binds the 
Brothers together.205 This is certainly the view promoted publicly by senior Brotherhood 
leaders. According to Khairat El-Shater, a deputy leader and the Brotherhood’s original 
presidential candidate in 2012, the organization’s preference for collaboration makes it 
“one of the most democratic organizations in Egypt.”206 The Brotherhood’s decision to 
support the Tahrir Square protesters during the Revolution, for example, lends some 
credence to Shater’s argument as the move was almost certainly driven by the insistence 
of the group’s younger members who, at least initially, found themselves at odds with the 
Brothers’ older and more cautious leadership who preferred to remain on the sidelines. 
Although the group may have some strive to resolve internal disputes 
democratically, it would be a mistake to draw any broader conclusions about the 
Brothers’ attitudes towards governance. Indeed, it is not difficult to draw parallels 
between the collaborative nature of the Brotherhood’s Shura and the emphasis on 
consensus among Iran’s clerical leadership. Like Iran’s clerical elite, the Brotherhood 
remains a fundamentally hierarchical structure. The two bodies that drive decision-
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making in the Brotherhood are a 15-member Guidance Office and a 100-member Shura 
Council. How exactly these two bodies share authority and determine policy remains 
unclear; however, a tolerance for dissent within a small, select group of insiders reveals 
little about how an organization actually plans to govern. Indeed, the extent to which 
President Morsi remains beholden to the Brotherhood’s executive leadership remains an 
open question. 
2. Attitudes towards Democracy and CMR 
For more than three decades the Brotherhood has relied on Egypt’s limited 
democratic openings to broaden its influence and become one of Egypt’s most vocal 
advocates for democratic reform. The process can be traced back to 1977 when the 
Brotherhood challenged Nasser’s 1954 decision to outlaw the group on the grounds that 
the RCC lacked the constitutional authority to impose such a ban. When it became clear 
that the courts would not rule in the Brotherhood’s favor, the group’s leader, Umar al-
Tilemensani, decided to pursue political participation more directly by seeking seats in 
parliament. Although Tilemensani’s decision to break into party politics was considered 
controversial by senior members of the Brotherhood, Tilemensani realized that 
parliamentary representation was the best method for remaining relevant in Egyptian 
society without provoking a backlash from Sadat. This ambition was not restricted to the 
Constituent Assembly. Around this same time the Brothers began to campaign for 
leadership positions within Egypt’s professional syndicates and student organizations. 
Even as Sadat and Mubarak targeted the group in periodic crackdowns, the Brothers 
continued to pursue legitimization through the democratic process. Even as a formal ban 
on the group remained in effect, the group emerged as the closest thing to a viable 
opposition party in Mubarak’s Egypt.  
It is not hard to identify the impact of democratic participation on the Brothers’ 
rhetoric. Although they have never wavered in their commitment to erecting an Islamist 
state based on Shari’a, the vision they have promoted is clearly targeted at an audience 
much broader than the Brothers’ conservative Muslim base. The group’s emphasis on 
social justice, religious tolerance, and political plurality was purposefully designed to 
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“[challenge] the Egyptian regime on its democratic credentials at least as often as on its 
religious ones.”207 The younger Brothers who became active in student organizations 
beginning in the 1980s promoted a vision of Islamism inclusive “all Egyptians, 
irrespective of race, religion, or ethnicity.”208 On the Brothers’ English-language website 
is an outline of the Brothers’ principles, which place a heavy emphasis on democratic 
ideals. The statement, adapted from a paper drafted in the late 1990s by then-deputy 
chairman Mohammad Ma’mun El-Hudaibi, identifies 15 “Principles of Agreement” 
illustrating the overlap between the Brothers’ vision of an Islamist Egyptian state with 
traditional democratic principles such as the freedom of assembly and religious 
expression.209  
Included among Hudaibi’s principles are three that relate specifically to the role 
of the military and security forces: 
Twelfth: Ensuring the independence of the judicial system at all 
levels…and jurisdiction of the military courts are restricted to cases 
involving military crimes and violations only. 
Fourteenth: The army must stay clear of politics, concentrating only on 
protecting the country’s external security, and that it should not be used, 
neither directly nor indirectly, by the governing authority in enforcing its 
wishes and control, or in prohibiting the people’s rights. 
Fifteenth: The police and all other security services must protect the 
security of the nation and as a whole, and that its utilization in maintaining 
the government or as a means of crushing opposition opinion should be 
prohibited. A system overlooks its work and leadership, and ensures the 
above, should be imposed; more specifically, it (security forces) must not 
be allowed to intervene in political activities and general elections.210 
Proclamations such as these were not only a vital part of the Brothers’ legitimization 
strategy in pre-Revolutionary Egypt, but almost certainly reflected a genuine frustration 
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with the pressure the Brothers felt from the military and security establishment. However, 
as the Brotherhood has assumed political control in Egypt over the last two years, many 
of the group’s actions seem to suggest that its support for democratic principles reflected 
political opportunism more than a serious commitment to reform.   
C. TRANSLATING PRINCIPLE INTO PRACTICE: UNDERSTANDING 
THE BROTHERS’ GOVERNING PHILOSOPHY AND APPROACH TO 
CMR 
Translating principle into practice is difficult for any political organization, 
particularly one that has been thrust into power as quickly as the Brothers have. 
Nevertheless, the speed with which the Brothers have “accommodat[ed] themselves to 
the authoritarian institutions” developed under Nasser, Sadat, and Mubarak has 
disappointed and alienated the country’s secular liberals.211 Morsi’s government has thus 
far shown little interest in curbing the military’s prerogatives or dispatching security 
forces to suppress demonstrators. Likewise, the Brothers’ willingness to undermine the 
potential checks on its authority, particularly the judiciary, strongly suggests that the 
Brothers are less interested in democratic reform than in consolidating power.  
1. Controlling the Streets 
Since coming to power in July 2012 Morsi’s government has had to contend with 
near-constant street protests over a variety of issues ranging from unpopular court 
decisions to economic concerns. While many of these protests relate to grievances not 
directly related to Morsi’s administration, the government’s heavy-handed approach to 
demonstrators has done little to improve the Brothers’ popular image. Morsi himself has 
often referred to protesters as “thugs” and enemies of democracy. More damaging than 
the rhetoric has been the government’s tolerance for the same tactics that proved so 
unpopular under Mubarak. For example, in January 2013 Morsi reinstated a “state of 
emergency” in certain Suez Canal provinces, dispatching CSF forces to put down the 
riots with force. In early February, the police were filmed beating a man then stripping 
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him naked and dragging him through the streets just outside the presidential palace. The 
episode drew international condemnation and caused one cabinet official to resign.212 
Critics suggest that the security forces have obliged the regime because they “have no 
other refuges but the regime.”213 In addition to the Interior Ministry’s CSF, reports of 
“Brotherhood militias”—not dissimilar to Iran’s Basij forces—have allegedly been 
involved in clashes with civilian restive neighborhoods. 
2. Détente with the Military? 
Morsi’s government has made little effort to check the military’s business 
interests or infringe on its autonomy. In December 2012, Morsi authorized the military to 
arrest civilians for the purposes of maintaining public order.214 The country’s new 
constitution largely protects the military from civilian oversight through vague language 
about parliament’s ability to review the military’s budget and the establishment of a 
powerful national defense council.215 The constitution also reaffirmed the military’s 
authority to try civilians in military courts for crimes that “harm the armed forces.”216 In 
return, the military appears to have thrown its support behind Morsi, at least for the time 
being. In late January 2013, Defense Minister General Abdel Fattah al-Sisi “sternly 
lectured” liberal opposition leaders Mohamed ElBaradei and Amr Mousa for their 
criticism of the regime, insisting that the military would “not be able to reassert control” 
should public pressure destabilize the government.  
A further signal of where Brotherhood-military relations may be heading comes 
from an allegation made by a former Brother named Tharwat al-Kharabawy. In a new 
book entitled, The Secret of the Temple, Kharabawy claims that a network of 
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“undercover” Brothers had infiltrated the military.217 While this claim remains largely 
unsubstantiated, the notion that the Egyptian military’s nearly 500,000 personnel includes 
at least a small cadre of Brothers or sympathizers seems well within the realm of 
possibility. Even if there is no merit to Kharabawy’s claim, the Brotherhood is almost 
certain to establish a toehold within the armed forces now that it is no longer an illicit 
organization. 
3. Undermining Democratic Institutions: The Judiciary and the New 
Constitution 
Since assuming office last year, no move has drawn more criticism than Morsi’s 
November 2012 decree that executive and parliamentary decisions were immune to 
judicial oversight. The declaration drew international attention and prompted the most 
intense protests of his young presidency. The public response was so overwhelming that 
Morsi was forced to rescind the declaration just two weeks after first issuing it. Still, the 
move signaled a willingness to challenge the authority of the judiciary in a manner that 
seems wholly inconsistent with the pledges of democratic reform the Brothers had 
promised prior to the Revolution.  
While the judicial immunity decree may have been more controversial, the 
drafting of the new constitution may be more consequential. On the one hand, many 
critics have argued that the document represents a decisive step towards greater 
democratization as it restricts some of the executive privileges outlined in the country’s 
1971 constitution. Marina Ottaway notes that the powers of the president are “clearly 
defined and far from dictatorial.”218 Article 135 limits the president to two four year 
terms. In a significant change from the Mubarak era, the Constituent Assembly “is 
protected from arbitrary dissolution and has important oversight powers.”219 Despite 
these improvements, the constitution has also elicited some serious criticism from 
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constitutional scholars. As previously discussed, the prerogatives afforded to the military 
certainly seem to undermine effective civilian control of the armed forces. Additionally, 
the document appears to open the door for greater influence by unelected Islamic scholars 
from al-Azhar University, as it mandates consultation on matters relating to Shari’a. 
While these scholars are not afforded any “hard political power,” the vagueness of the 
Article 219 raises questions about how such consultation will be enforced and what it will 
mean in practice.220 
More than any particular constitutional provision, the process of drafting the 
document and the low turnout for the popular referendum that brought it into force is a 
poor sign for Egyptian democracy under the Brotherhood’s stewardship. Nearly one-
quarter of the 100-member Constituent Assembly resigned in protest during the drafting 
process.221  
D. SUPPORTING DEMOCRACY’S LINEAMENTS BUT NOT ITS VALUES 
Bassam Tibi’s assertion that Islamist organizations tend to view democracy 
instrumentally certainly seems to apply to the Muslim Brotherhood. The Brothers’ 
organizational strength far surpasses that of any other political organization in Egypt 
today. They have not lost a popular vote since 2011 and have demonstrated an eagerness 
for returning to the polls in order to help legitimize their political objectives. Although 
the Brothers revealed an ability to make common cause with secular liberals while 
Mubarak was in power, they have not carried this spirit to the presidential palace. As 
Amr Elshobaki suggested in 2011, the Brothers’ embrace of “the methods and lineaments 
of democracy” seems to fall short of its “the cultural and political values.”222 
With respect to the military and security forces, Morsi’s government has done 
little to break with the authoritarian tendencies of the Mubarak regime. While this pattern 
of protecting the military’s autonomy and relying on the Interior Ministry to contain 
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domestic unrest may continue in the near term, over time the Brotherhood is almost 
certain to try to rely on its organizational strength to co-opt the security apparatus. The 
educational mission that is central to the Brothers’ own recruitment process is likely to be 
replicated in some form on the national scale and could be used as a means to ensure 
loyalty and determine promotions within the armed forces and security establishment.  
Of course, it is far from certain that the Brotherhood will remain in power over 
the long term. As stated at the beginning of this chapter, there remains tremendous 
uncertainty in Egypt. The unity of the Brotherhood, the allegiance of the military, and the 
organizational capacity of opposition parties will all be severely tested within the next 
several years and will ultimately determine the fate of Egyptian democracy and the 






VII. CONCLUSION: A MORE DURABLE AUTHORITARIANISM? 
As the “third wave” of democratization spread across the globe turning most 
national governments into democratic ones, Middle East observers began to speak of a 
“durable authoritarianism” that against all odds seemed to preserve autocratic rule in the 
region. While the “Arab Spring” revolutions initially seemed destined to finally bring 
democracy to the region, the early returns suggest that the region may in fact be heading 
for a yet more durable kind of authoritarianism in the form of Islamist governance. 
Because Islamist organizations are fundamentally grassroots movements, they are well-
positioned to take full advantage of whatever democratic openings they are afforded. 
Although new Islamist governments are likely to appear more democratic than the 
authoritarian ones they replace and may in fact enjoy substantial popular support, the 
Islamist experiences in Iran, Turkey, and Egypt reveal a yawning gap between popular 
legitimacy and democratic reform. Paradoxically, the popular support enjoyed by Islamist 
organizations may actually represent the greatest obstacle to democratization, as ballot 
box success can enable the “dominant party overreach” that leads to the subversion of 
democratic norms.223 This tendency is only exacerbated by these countries’ authoritarian 
pasts and the weakness of their democratic institutions. 
It is important to note that it is not Islam or even religiously-inspired illiberalism 
that constitutes the greatest hurdle to democratization.224 Neither the AKP nor the 
Muslim Brotherhood has favored a radical religious agenda. Although religion has 
assumed a much larger role in public life in post-Revolutionary Iran, religiosity is not 
driving the country’s deteriorating democracy. The willingness to subvert democratic 
norms stems not from religion per se, but from the elevation of a set of ideals above 
democratic ones. Political leaders who practice exclusionary politics and subvert 
democratic norms cannot rightfully be considered democratic; however, Islamist leaders 
who do so in the name of Islamizing the state do not betray the cause to which they owe 
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their support. That this appears to be happening in Turkey, where the dominant Islamist 
movement has rejected the Islamist label and publicly insists that its loyalty remains 
above all to preserving the state’s secular and democratic principles, strongly suggests 
that Islamists view democracy merely as a useful but non-essential means for maximizing 
power.  
This has important implications for the future of CMR in the region. Perhaps the 
most fundamental question is whether Iran’s success in using the military as a vehicle for 
expanding its Islamist ideology makes it an outlier or places the Islamic Republic ahead 
of the curve. In addition to strict oversight of the military, Iran has introduced an 
intensive ideological indoctrination program as part of conscripted and volunteer service. 
The intention is two-fold: to ensure the continual spread of the Islamists’ revolutionary 
ideology and to create a force that internalizes those values, including the principle of 
velayat-e faqih, so that civilian oversight mechanisms become unnecessary. In essence, 
the Iranian model emphasizes a sort of endogenous control of the military. No such effort 
can be identified in Turkey or Egypt as of yet. The AKP appears to remain focused 
primarily on weakening the military’s political influence and has not attempted any sort 
of systematic effort to indoctrinate military members in an Islamist ideology. Indeed, 
Ankara has even allowed more men to opt out of conscription, suggesting that the AKP 
continues to view the military as more a threat than an opportunity. In Egypt, the 
Brothers seem focused on more immediate goal of stability preservation. The prospects 
for overt Islamization of the armed forces in Turkey and Egypt are further hampered by 
the military’s popularity in each country. While Iran was able to accelerate the 
Islamization of the military due to its unpopularity and close association to the Shah, a 
similar effort in Turkey or Egypt would almost certainly provoke a backlash from the 
military and the public. Yet greater Islamization of the force can also be achieved in less 
overt ways, including the silent infiltration efforts allegedly underway in the Egyptian 
military and the TNP. This suggests that even in Turkey and Egypt, Islamizing the force 
and achieving a degree of endogenous control comparable to that of Iran remains within 
the realm of possibility. 
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Regardless of whether Islamist governments in Turkey and Egypt prove capable 
of fully indoctrinating the military, they are unlikely to abandon non-democratic control 
mechanisms in favor of democratic processes. The Turkish case is illustrative here, as the 
Ergenekon and Sledgehammer criminal investigations that purged the military’s 
leadership ranks began after the AKP had already achieved substantial CMR reform 
through the EU accession process. Those investigations enabled the AKP to achieve the 
sort of swift and radical results that are simply not possible through slower and more 
bureaucratic democratic reforms. Likewise, Islamist leaders are unlikely to cede their 
authority over the military in accordance with democratic prescriptions in any way that 
could allow non-Islamist forces to gain influence over the military. In practical terms, this 
means that Islamists are unlikely to allow substantial parliamentary oversight of the 
military as this could enable opposition parties to influence military decision-making. 
With respect to the military’s internal affairs, democratic control mechanisms that protect 
the military’s autonomy on certain matters, such as control over training regimens or 
promotion of junior officers, are unlikely to gain support from Islamists concerned about 
the potential for non-Islamist ideologies to emerge from within the ranks. Such anxiety 
has guided military reform efforts in Ba’athist Iraq and Revolutionary Iran, and may 
ultimately steer policies in Turkey and Egypt. 
If Islamism is unlikely to produce to genuinely democratic forms of civilian 
control of the military, it appears equally unlikely to give way to classical authoritarian or 
sultanistic patterns of CMR whereby the military effectively decays into a patronage-
based network designed to preserve the authority of an individual ruler. Even in Iran 
where the Supreme Leader can develop a cult of personality, the Guards appear more 
committed to the concept of velayat-e faqih than the individual serving as Supreme 
Leader. Khamenei did not attempt to purge the military after Khomeini’s death nor did he 
install senior leaders personally loyal to him. Rather, Iran’s leadership appears to 
maintain great confidence in the Guards’ ideological adherence. While no such 
indoctrination program has been put into effect in either Egypt or Turkey, the reports of 
Islamist infiltration of the armed forces and security sector might suggest that personal 
loyalty is less relevant than ideological cohesion. Erdogan might be the only Islamist 
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figure in any of the three countries capable of securing a cadre of personally loyal 
officers; however, Turkey does not have a history of sultanism and the power and 
influence of the country’s non-military elites—including the Gülenists—would make it 
difficult for Erdogan to build a sultanistic, patronage-based network.  
The Islamist approach to CMR thus seems to be something new for the region: a 
combination of competitive authoritarian elements and totalitarian ones. Islamists’ 
reliance on ideological officers and willingness to employ “terror, conspiracy, 
surveillance, and force” to ensure loyalty from the armed forces are the techniques 
common to ideology-bases totalitarian regimes, while the embrace of democratic 
processes, provided that outcomes can be managed, is consistent with competitive 
authoritarian trends.225 Given Islamism’s popularity and grassroots appeal, this 
combination appears fairly intractable and will in all likelihood forestall genuine 
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